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The Thin Flat Line:
Redefining Who is Legally Dead
in Organ Donation After Cardiac Death
Maxine M. Harrington, J.D."
ABSTRACT: The debate over whether donation after cardiac
death (DCD) donors are truly dead is not new but has surfaced
mostly in the academic community. In 2008, widespread public-
ity was given to the indictment of a transplant surgeon in Califor-
nia in connectionwith the alleged administration of excessive and
inappropriate medications to a potential donor awaiting cardiac
death after removal from a ventilator. This and other reports in
the lay press mirror the expanding use of DCD to boost the supply
of organs.
This article explains the practice of donation after cardiac
death, examines whether DCD donors are legally dead under the
UDDA, explores whether it is appropriate to apply DCD as it is
currently practiced, addresses the concern that DCD is causing
the death of donors, and suggests several approaches to resolve
the controversy over the determination of death in DCD donors.
The author concludes with a call for this debate to move beyond
scholarly journals into the public arena.
Well, it just so happens that your friend here is only mostly dead. There's
a big difference between mostly dead and all dead. Now, mostly dead is
slightly alive.'
By the end of 2008, a pilot program to recover organs from those dying
on the streets of New York City could be in effect.' Under a federally-funded
grant, the city is proposing to expand the donor pool by deploying a "rapid
. Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., George Washington
University; B.A., University of North Dakota. Copyright © 2009 Denver University Law
Review, 86 DENY. U. L. REv. 335, University of Denver Sturm College of Law and Maxine M.
Harrington. Reprinted with permission.
THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1987).
'Cara Buckley, City Plans Ambulancefor Donor Collections, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2oo8,
at A35.
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organ-recovery ambulance" to procure the organs of people who die of
cardiac arrest outside hospitals.' According to newspaper reports, a special
transplant ambulance would trail an emergency ambulance responding to
notification of a victim with cardiac arrest.4 After regular paramedics cease
resuscitation efforts, the transplant ambulance team would wait five minutes
and then attempt to maintain the viability of organs by administering drugs
and by performing chest compressions to the victim until more extensive
preservation efforts could be performed at the hospital and consent for
donation from the next of kin could be obtained.
Announcement of the program generated considerable controversy. One
commentator referred to the organ-recovery ambulance as a "meat wagon."6
An academic bioethicist pronounced the initiative "disgusting."7 Another
bioethicist voiced her concern that the victims of cardiac arrest might not be
"irreversibly" dead when the organ transplant team took over minutes after
resuscitation efforts ceased.8
Within a few months after the New York City initiative was announced,
the New England Journal ofMedicine reported that a team of physicians at
Denver Children's Hospital had been able to transplant hearts from three
infant donors who were not brain-dead, but who had been removed from
mechanical life support.9 Death was declared in one infant three minutes
after cardiac and respiratory efforts ceased; in the other two infants, death
was pronounced after seventy-five seconds of absent heart and lung
functions."° Once death was declared, organ recovery began." Again, some
medical bioethicists were alarmed. George Annas, who has been called the
"father of patient rights,"12 warned: "The donors are not dead. I understand
they would like us to change the definition of death, but they can't do that by
3 Id.; see also Rob Stein, N.Y. Planning SpecialAmbulance to Recover Organs, WASH.
POST, May 24, 2008, at Ao.
4 Buckley, supra note 2.
s Stein, supra note 3, at Ao8.
6 William Saletan, Meat Wagons, SLATE, May 27, 2008, http:// www.slate.com/logs/
logs/humannature/archive/20o8/o5/27/meat-wagons.aspx.
7 Stein, supra note 3 (quoting Michael A. Grodin, director of bioethics at Boston
University).
8 Id. (quoting Leslie M. Whetsine, a bioethicist at Walsh University).
' MarkM. Boucek etal., PediatricHeart TransplantationAfter Declaration ofCardio-
circulatory Death, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 709, 711, 713 (2OO8). As an indication of the
importance of this debate, The New England Journal of Medicine also featured three
perspective reports, an editorial, and a videotaped roundtable discussion among bioethicists,
all of which are available on the journal's website at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/
full/359/7/669/DC1 (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
1o Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 711.
1 Id.
Boston University School of Public Health, George Annas, Biography, http://sph.bu.
edu/index.php?option=com-sphdir&id=239&temid=34o&INDEX=577 (lastvisited Dec. 19,
2008).
The Thin Flat Line: Redefining Who is Legally Dead
themselves."'3 Robert M. Veatch, professor of medical ethics at Georgetown
University, added:
The whole issue is whether the infants from whom the hearts were taken
were dead. It seems very clear to me that they were not. I think it's illegal,
and if it's illegal, what we're talking about is the physicians causing the
death of the three patients, and that would be homicide. It's immoral. I
think it should be stopped.14
Should we worry that organs are being removed from people who are
just "mostly" dead? Law and medicine are grappling with a fundamental
tension between, on the one hand, delaying the pronouncement of death
until there is no chance of recovery and, on the other hand, increasing the
quantity and quality of organs for transplant by pronouncing death as soon
as possible. This article examines whether, in the relentless pursuit of
organs, medicine has gone too far in tinkering with the definition of death.
Most cadaveric organs are recovered from donors who meet brain death
criteria.'5 There is, however, a growing imbalance between the number of
brain-dead donors and the demand for organs. The New York City study and
the Denver Children's Hospital protocol are recent examples of a movement
in the transplant community to increase the supply of organs by using
donors whose heart and lung functions have ceased, but who are not yet
brain dead. This practice, known as donation after cardiac death (DCD), has
proved controversial for a number of reasons." This article addresses the
threshold controversy: whether DCD donors are legally dead at the time
organ procurement begins.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and its state
counterparts require the "irreversible" cessation of the functions of either (1)
the entire brain or (2) the heart and lungs before a person can be considered
dead.17 There is a significant debate among scholars over whether the UDDA
" Rob Stein, Infant Transplant Procedure Ignites Debate; Ethicists Question Strategy
in Which Hearts Are Removed MinutesAfter They Stop Beating, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2008,
at Aol (quoting George J. Annas).
1 Id. (quoting Robert M. Veatch); see also James L. Bernat, The Boundaries of Organ
DonationAfter Circulatory Death, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 669,671 (2008) (asserting that the
protocol's shortened time period for determining death did not comply with prevailing
medical standards).
" See Eelco F.M. Wijdicks, The Diagnosis ofBrain Death, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1215,
1215-18 (2001) (describing the clinical criteria used to determine brain death, and noting that
"brain death is the principle requisite for the donation of organs for transplantation").
6 Concerns have also been raised about the pre-mortem administration of drugs and
preservation of organs in the dying or newly dead donor; see Sarah D. Barber, The Tell-Tale
Heart: Ethical and Legal Implications of In Situ Organ Preservation in the Non-Heart-
Beating Cadaver Donor, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 471, 473, 487-89 (1996); see also infra note 111.
'7 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 589 (198o); see also discussion
infra Part III.
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recognizes two kinds of death or only two different criteria, cardiac and
neurological, under a unitary concept of death."8 The proponents of DCD
have resolved this controversy by recognizing donation after "cardiac death,"
where organs can be removed minutes after the heart stops, before brain
death occurs.' 9 Locating a precise moment of death is not an issue in most
victims of cardiac arrest. It is a primary issue in DCD, however, because once
the heart stops, there is a need to protect transplantable organs from
deteriorating due to a lack of blood flow.2" The quality of organs is less of a
concern with patients who are declared dead under brain death criteria
because the donor is maintained on artificial support after death to keep the
heart and lungs functioning throughout organ procurement.2' The DCD
donor is not declared dead until life support is withdrawn or unsuccessful
resuscitation is terminated." The need for viable organs creates a conflict
between ensuring that the donor patient is dead and removing organs as
soon as possible.
3
As DCD is generally practiced in the United States, death is declared two
to five minutes after the cessation of cardiac and respiratory functions. 4
Once a diagnosis of cardiac death is made, transplant surgeons begin the
process of organ retrieval. It is unlikely that the DCD donor satisfies the
criteria for brain death at the time of organ procurement as it takes longer
than five minutes for the entire brain to be irreversibly damaged from lack
of oxygen.25 The speed with which a diagnosis of death is made in the DCD
context is done solelyto facilitate organ procurement. 6 The closer the donor
is to life, the more useful the organs will be to the recipient.
18 Alexander M. Capron, Brain Death- WellSettled Yet Still Unresolved, 344 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1244, 1245 (2001).
" Robert Steinbrook, Organ DonationAfter Cardiac Death, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 209,
209 (2007).
20 INST. OF MED., NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: PRACTICE AND
PROTOCOLS 22 (20OO), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id=9700
[hereinafter 2000 IOM Report].
" George J. Annas, Brain Death and Organ Donation: You Can Have One Without the
Other, 18 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 28 (1988).
22 Robert D. Truog & Franklin Miller, The Dead Donor Rule and Organ Transplanta-
tion, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 674, 674 (2008).
23 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20 (noting that the "need to maintain organ viability
creates a strong incentive for an early determination of death").
24 See James L. Bernat et al., Report of a National Conference on Donation After
Cardiac Death, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 281, 282 (2006) (stating that most organ
procurement organizations use a five minute interval, while three use an interval of two
minutes and one uses four minutes). Pediatric DCD is relatively new, and with two donors,
Denver Children's Hospital waited only seventy-five seconds after death to begin organ
retrieval. See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 711 and accompanying text.
" See Barber, supra note 16, at 471-72 (definingbrain death); see also infra notes 211-12
and accompanying text.
26 Rob Stein, New Trend in Organ Donation Raises Questions, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,
2007, at AO3.
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The debate over whether DCD donors are truly dead is not new but has
surfaced mostly in the academic community. Recently, however, DCD has
become a focus of media and public attention, as demonstrated by the
debate over the New York City and Denver Children's Hospital initiatives.
In addition, the Washington Post featured an article in March 2007 about
a "new trend in organ donation," airing the concerns of some physicians and
bioethicists about the controversial practice of donation after cardiac
death.27 In 2008, widespread publicity was given to the indictment of a
transplant surgeon in California in connection with the alleged administra-
tion of excessive and inappropriate medications to a potential donor
awaiting cardiac death after removal from a ventilator.28
These reports in the lay press mirror the expanding use of DCD to boost
the supply of organs. Although the number of organs transplanted from
cardiac death donors is still relatively small, 29 an increase is expected as
hospitals and organ procurement organizations begin to develop DCD
policies under mandate from oversight bodies.3 0 Currently, most DCD
donors are severely ill, hospitalized patients who do not meet the criteria for
brain death but who have decided, either personally or through a surrogate,
to refuse resuscitation and to withdraw life-sustaining medical care. 3' The
controversy over whether patients are "dead enough" for organ pro-
curement has focused almost exclusively on this subset of potential donors,
and little attention has been given to the distinct medical and legal concerns
presented by the expansion of DCD to victims of sudden cardiac arrest
outside the hospital. There is an obvious conflict between the right of these
individuals to adequate emergency resuscitative efforts and the need to
procure organs only minutes after cessation of the heartbeat. Removing
organs a mere seventy-five seconds after the heart stops and transplanting
hearts from donors who are not brain dead are two other recent develop-
ments in DCD that test the legal and ethical boundaries of organ transplan-
tation. These controversial practices raise fundamental questions about the
27 Id.
28 See Jesse McKinley, Surgeon Is Accused of Hurrying Death of Patient to Get Organs,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at Al (reporting that transplant physician ordered excessive doses
of morphine andAtivan and administered Betadine, a topical antiseptic, through anasogastric
tube). The physician was acquitted of all charges in December 2008, although the jury issued
a note with its verdict stating that the case illustrated a need for clear standards in cardiac
death donation. Jesse McKinley, Surgeon ClearedofHarming Man to Rush Organ Removal,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A20.
19 In 2006, DCD organs comprised eight percent of the total cadaveric organs
transplanted. HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVS.ADMIN., 2007ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE U.S. ORGAN
PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORKAND THE SCIENTIFIC REGISTRYOF TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS: TRANSPLANT DATA 1997-2OO6, Table 1.1 (2007), available at http://www.
optn.org/AR2007/lol_dh.pdf [hereinafter 2007 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report].
30 See infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
31 Steinbrook, supra note 19, at 209-10.
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extent to which society is willing to tolerate the removal of vital organs from
people we cannot be certain are dead in order to satisfy the escalating
demand for organs. This article suggests that there is a need for a wider
public debate on the permissible limits of DCD, but that a reasonable
accommodation can be reached without compromising legal standards for
determining death. There are ethically defensible reasons to allow this form
of organ procurement in hospitalized patients voluntarily removed from life
support, but absent broad social and political consensus, DCD, as currently
practiced, should not be expanded to other potential donors.
Part I of this article begins with a brief background of solid organ
transplantation and the statutory framework in which it operates. Part II
explains the practice of donation after cardiac death and the history of its
use in the United States. Part III examines whether DCD donors are legally
dead under the UDDA. In Part IV, the article explores whether it is
appropriate, given the speed with which death is determined, to apply DCD
as it is currently practiced to those in sudden cardiac arrest or to children.
Part V addresses the concern that DCD is causing the death of donors. Part
VI suggests several approaches to resolve the controversy over the determi-
nation of death in DCD donors. This article concludes with a call for this
debate to move beyond scholarly journals into the public arena.
I. A Brief History of Solid Organ Transplantation
and the Legal Response
The first successful human transplant was performed in 1954 when Dr.
Joseph Murray transplanted a kidney from a live donor into his identical
twin brother.32 Eight years later, Dr. Murray performed the first transplant
from a cadaveric donor.33 Early cadaveric transplants, primarily kidneys,
were from patients who had suffered traditional circulatory death, where the
lungs and heart ceased functioning.34 Survival rates of recipients were poor,
however, primarily due to problems with rejection and poor organ quality
caused by warm ischemia time,35 the period in which the donor's organs
begin to die from lack of an oxygenated blood supply.36
In the 196os and early 1970s, the use of neurological criteria to define
death, which eventually came to be known as brain death, began to
32 Peter I. Abt et al., Donation After Cardiac Death in the US: History and Use, 203 J.
AM. COLL. SURGEONS 208, 209 (2006).
33 Id.
34 Id.
31 Warm ischemia time refers to the time in which the heart and lungs are not
functioning adequately to ensure the flow of blood to the organs. Without blood, oxygen
cannot be delivered and vital organs will die. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at xv.
36 Abt et al., supra note 32, at 212.
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develop.3 7 In 1959, French neurophysiologists coined the term, le coma
depasse, or irreversible coma, to describe patients with irreparable brain
damage. 38 Bythe mid-196os, medical technology had progressed to the point
where it was possible to keep patients with devastating neurological injuries
alive.3 9 In many of these cases, medical tests, including the electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) demonstrated irreversible cessation of brain activity.40 Some
patients developed what is known as respirator brain, a condition where the
heart and lungs can be kept functioning through mechanical ventilation, but
where the brain tissue shows extensive signs of cell death.
41
The burgeoning transplant community understood the implications of
being able to recover organs that were still perfusing, or receiving a blood
supply, through artificial support while the person was brain dead.42
Recovering organs from a "heart-beating donor" would avoid the problem
of warm ischemia time associated with circulatory death, which diminishes
the quality of organs available for transplantation.4 3 In other words, the
donor's brain would be dead, but the transplantable organs still very much
alive.
There was a perceived legal impediment to the removal of organs from
those who had suffered brain death, however. State laws were silent or
unsettled on the new phenomenon of neurological death.44 The common law
defined death as cardiac and respiratory failure. 45 Transplant surgeons who
attempted to remove organs from persons who were brain dead but who still
had heart and lung function, albeit mechanically, were concerned with





40 Id. at 213.
41 PRESIDENT'S COMM. FORTHESTUDYOFETHICAL PROBLEMSIN MED. ANDBIOMEDICALAND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 23 (1981), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/
reports/past_commissions/defining-death.pdf [hereinafter DEFINING DEATH].
42 Id. (stating that there was a "new urgency" in the transplant community to recognize
brain death).
41 See N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686,689 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(noting agreement of experts that kidneys obtained from donors who died from
cardiopulmonary death resulted in an eighty-eight percent incidence of renal failure in the
recipient, while kidneys from those who were brain dead were indistinguishable from those
obtained from living donors).
44 See id. at 689-91 (addressing a petition for declaratory judgment that New York's
definition of death included neurological death).
Id. at 689; Lovatov. Dist. Court Tenth Judicial Dist., 6Ol P.2d 1O72, 1076 (Colo. 1979).
46 See Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (noting that one of the reasons the petitioner sought
court approval of a new definition of death was the fear of potential criminal or civil liability);
see also Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon R. Kass,A Statutory Definition of the Standards
for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal anda Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 97-100
(1972) (discussing the need for a statutory definition of neurological death to allay profession-
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In 1968, the landmark work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School was published, which proposed irreversible coma as a new
criterion for determining death.47 The committee stated that its purpose was
two-fold: to decrease the burden on families of keeping a person on
continued medical support who had irreversible brain damage, and to
facilitate the recovery of organs from such people because they were dead,
not under traditional circulatory criteria, but under the new definition of
brain death. 48 According to the Ad Hoc Committee, "[o]bsolete criteria for
the definition of death can lead to controversy in obtaining organs for
transplantation."49 The Ad Hoc Committee's findings were quickly and
widely accepted by the medical community. In 1970, Kansas adopted the
first statute to formulate a legal definition of death to include brain death,
as well as circulatory death. 0 Other states quickly followed suit and, by
1980, twenty-four states had enacted statutory definitions of death that
incorporated brain death."
Due to the failure of some states to enact brain death legislation and the
lack of uniformity in existing state laws, in 198o Congress convened an
interdisciplinary body under the auspices of the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (President's Commission) to explore the advisability of developing
a uniform definition of death.5 2 In 1981, the President's Commission
recommended adoption of the Uniform Determination of Death Act
(UDDA) .5 The UDDA provides:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determi-
nation of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical
standards. 4
als' fears of civil and criminal litigation).
11 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85, 85 (1968) [hereinafter Ad Hoc
Committee]. The report uses the terms irreversible coma and brain death coextensively. Id.
at 88. Later, the medical community would recognize that these diagnoses are not
interchangeable. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 25.
48 Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 47, at 85.
49 Id.
50 Capron & Kass, supra note 46, at lO8-O9.
5' DEATH: BEYOND WHOLE-BRAIN CRITERIA 2 (Richard M. Zaner ed., 1988).
s DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 1, 7-8; see also supra at 24-25 (the Commission
stated that it was also necessary to clarify the "misleading" term, irreversible coma, used by
the Ad Hoc Committee in its 1968 report).
53 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41.
54 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 781 (2008).
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The President's Commission was aware of the impact its recommenda-
tions would have on the burgeoning field of organ transplantation. If the
UDDA were widely adopted, neurologically devastated patients with
functioning hearts and lungs could be declared dead in every jurisdiction.5
The Commission's hopes were soon realized. The UDDA or similar
legislation was approved in almost every state, although the statutes are not
entirely "uniform" in their definitions of death.5' Legal recognition of brain
death led to the almost universal abandonment of organ procurement from
persons suffering a traditional death following cardiac arrest. 7 Because
mechanical ventilation sustained the vital functions of the heart and lungs,
the quality of organs recovered from brain-dead, heart-beating donors was
vastly superior to organs impaired by the warm ischemia time associated
with circulatory death.
58
To promote organ donation, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)
was adopted in 1968, and subsequently revised in 1987 and 20o6.59 This act
encourages cadaveric organ transplantation by authorizing the donation of
an organ by an adult effective at death and by the next of kin after death. 0
The UAGA also immunizes physicians recovering organs in good faith from
civil and criminal prosecution. 61 Every state has adopted one of the versions
of the UAGA.
62
As a mechanism for organizing organ donations and transplantation,
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) was passed in 1984.63 NOTA
established the Organ Procurement Transplantation Network (OPTN),
which is charged with maintaining a waiting list of individuals who need
organs, matching potential recipients with organs, operating a system for
procuring and allocating organs, and increasing the supply of organs.6 4 In
s5 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 7-8 (asserting that state variations in the definition
of death are not acceptable).
56 See generally Jason L Goldsmith, Wanted! Dead and/orAlive: Choosing Among the
Not-So-Uniform Statutory Definitions of Death, 61 U. MLII L. REV. 871, 889-90 (2007)
(noting differences in the language of state law definitions of death).
17 See Abt et al., supra note 32, at 213-14 (noting that after the recognition of brain
death, almost every transplant center stopped retrieving organs from DCD patients); Michael
A. DeVita, et al., Observations of Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment From Patients
Who Became Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donors, 28 CRITICALCARE MED. 1709, 1709 (2000)
(stating that non-heart-beating donation was largely abandoned when it was found that
organs from brain-dead donors had better survival).
"8 See Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
59 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFTACT §§ 1-11 (amended 2oo6), 8A U.L.A. 27, 19 (Supp. 2008).
60 Id. §§4,9.
6, Id. § 18.
61 Joseph B. Clamon, TaxPolicy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation
Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 76 (2008) (stating that the UAGA has been
adopted in one of its forms by all fifty states).
63 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 273-274g (2008).
64 Id. § 274(b)(2).
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1986, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) received the first (and
only) federal contract to operate the OPTN and to coordinate the placement
of organs and the collection of data on donor and transplant recipients.61 The
OPTN also includes a system of regional Organ Procurement Organizations
(OPOs) that are responsible for procuring, testing, and distributing organs
within their respective geographic areas.66
II. The Renewed Interest in Donation
After Cardiac Death
The clinical field of transplantation was spurred not only by the shift in
recovery of better qualityorgans from brain-dead, heart-beating donors, but
also by improved techniques for preserving organs after their removal and
bythe use of immunosuppressants to prevent organ rejection in recipients. 7
In particular, the discovery of cyclosporine in 1978 is thought to have
revolutionized the field of transplantation by markedly improving survival
rates in organ recipients.68
By the end of the twentieth century, solid organ transplantation had
become the standard of care for treating organ failure, with recipients living
longer with better quality of life than that offered by conventional treat-
ments.6" For example, numerous studies demonstrate that with end-stage
renal failure, patients who receive kidney transplants have significantly
higher long-term survival rates compared to those who remain on dialysis.70
Yet transplantation is "a victim of its own success. '7 With improvement
in the lives of recipients, the demand for transplants has far outstripped the
supply. Even if all brain-dead patients were suitable donors, the number of
organs recovered could not meet the needs of all the patients on the
transplant waiting list.72 In 1997, there were a total of 9,539 donors; by
2006, that number had increased to 14,756, of which 8,024 were cadaveric
65 United Networkfor Organ Sharing: Organ Donation and Transplantation, History
of the UNOS Database, http:// www.unos.org/data/about/history.asp (last visited Dec. 18,
2008).
66 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3).
67 Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
68 Id. at 208, 214.
69 Id. at 214.
70 See, e.g., J.E. Locke et al., Outcomes of Kidneys from Donors After Cardiac Death:
Implications for Allocation and Preservation, 7AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1797, 1803 (2007)
(noting a sixty-eight percent reduction in the long-term mortality of transplanted patients
over those on dialysis).
" Mark D. Fox, Stewards of a Public Trust: Responsible Transplantation, 3 AM. J.
BIOETHICS V, vi (2003).
72 Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United
States, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 667, 673 (2003).
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donors and 6,732 were living donors. 73 Duringthe same period, however, the
waiting list 74 increased by more than 40,000: from 55,501 in 1997 to 98,263
in 20o6.
75
In response to the growing imbalance between supply and demand,
there has been a surge of new initiatives to increase the donor pool. The
National Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative was established in
2003 to develop best practices for hospitals in order to achieve organ
donation rates of seventy-five percent, up from an average of forty-three
percent.76 Medicare conditions of participation require each hospital to
notify its OPO of all patient deaths and imminent deaths so that the OPO has
the opportunity to determine the suitability of potential organ donors. 77 The
deceased donor pool has been expanded through the use of "marginal"
organs, so that older donors or those with an underlying disease are being
increasingly used to fill the need for cadaveric organs.78 The use of living
donors, primarily for kidneys, increased by seventy percent from 1997
through 2004, but has fallen slightly in the last several years.7 9 Despite
current law prohibiting the sale of organs," there have been proposals to
financially incentivize donors, either through payments to the donor before
death or the family after death, although none of these controversial
recommendations has been implemented.8' Xenotransplantation, the trans-
plantation of organs from non-humans to humans, is in the experimental
stage but its use is severely limited by unknown health risks and ethical
82questions.
73 2007 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 29, at Table 1.1.
74 2007 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 29, at Chapter I (noting that some
patients may be listed on multiple waiting lists, and the total number of registrations is higher
than the number of unique patients); id. (stating that thirty percent of those on the waiting
list are deemed "inactive" because they are not immediately eligible for an organ if one
becomes available); see also Rob Stein, A Third of Patients on Transplant List Are Not
Eligible, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2008, at Ao (questioning the reliability of the waiting list
numbers).
7' 2007 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 29, at Table 1.3.
76 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROGRAMS, DIV. OF TRANSPLANTATION No. 240-94-0037, THE ORGAN
DONATION BREAKTHROUGH COLLABORATIVE: BEST PRACTICES FINAL REPORT (2003), available
at http://www.njha.com/onit/pdf/93o20530512PM71.pdf.
17 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(1) (2003).
78 Craig R. Smith & Jeffrey A. Lowell, Ethical Considerations in Organ Donation and
Transplantation, 15 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 231, 235 (2000).
79 2007 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 29, at Table 1.1.
So National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C § 274e (2008).
See generally Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End
America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 69, 1o8-118 (2004) (summarizing financial
initiatives to increase organ donation).
8 See generally Margaret A. Clark, This Little Piggy Went to Market: The Xeno-
transplantation and Xenozoonose Debate, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 137, 138-145 (1999)
(discussing the medical, ethical, and legal issues raised by xenotrasplantation).
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Finally, pressure to increase the supply of organs caused the transplant
community to re-examine organ retrieval from patients who were not
brain-dead but whose circulatory functions had stopped."s By the end of the
twentieth century, the once seemingly insurmountable problems associated
with warm ischemia time and the rapid deterioration of organs after cardiac
arrest were being alleviated with improved donor preparation and organ
preservation methods.8s These donors were originally referred to as
non-heart-beating donors (NHBDs), in contrast to the heart-beating donors
who suffered brain death.15 Donation from a non-heart-beating donor is now
termed donation after cardiac death (DCD) and that term is used throughout
this article to provide a consistent terminology.8 6
Legal developments in end-of-life care also spurred renewed interest in
DCD. In 1968, at the time of the Ad Hoc Committee's recognition of brain
death, physicians were urged not to remove respirators before a declaration
of death was made as this could subject them to legal jeopardy." Beginning
with the Quinlan case in 1976,8 through Cruzan in 199o,89 the "right to die"
debate had evolved from a nascent movement to widespread acceptance of
a patient's right to withdraw life-sustaining technology. Patients who were
terminally ill but not brain-dead and who requested or had their surrogates
request removal of extraordinary care were now a potential source of
organs."
Organ donors who die from cardiac death rather than brain death are
categorized as either controlled or uncontrolled donors.9' In the controlled
83 Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 One critic has alleged that the terminology was changed from NHBD to DCD as a
marketing ploy in the face of uncertainty in determining death. Mohammed Y. Rady et al.,
Non-Heart Beating, or Cardiac Death, Organ Donation: Why We Should Care, 2 J. HosP.
MED. 324, 328 (2007). The Institute of Medicine has suggested that the terminology be
further refined to donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). COMMITTEE ON
INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 128
(James F. Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman, eds., 2oo6), available at http:// www.iom.edu/
CMS/374o/24738/34249.aspx [hereinafter 2006 IOM Report].
87 Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 47, at 339.
88 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that a patient has a constitutional right of privacy to
terminate life-sustaining treatment).
"q Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment).
90 ROGER HERDMAN &JOHN T. POTrS, DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION MEDICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN
PROCUREMENT 24 (1997), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=6o36
[hereinafter 1997 IOM Report].
9' Id. at 1. These categories are derived from the classification of non-heart-beating
donors developed at the University Hospital Maastricht in the Netherlands. Id. at 25. The
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group are those who are neurologically damaged or severely ill, usually on
a ventilator, and who have a planned withdrawal from life-sustaining
treatment because of the futility of further care.9 The uncontrolled donor
includes those who experience an out-of-hospital cardiac arrest or who are
hospitalized and suffer an unexpected cardiac arrest and are not successfully
resuscitated.
93
Most DCD donors are in the controlled group, where the timing of
cardiac arrest and the retrieval of organs are carefully planned events and
provide transplant surgeons with the shortest time for the retrieval of viable
organs. 94 To approach the success rates of transplantation with organs from
brain-dead, heart-beating donors requires a short interval to death and a
prompt declaration of death followed by rapid organ retrieval and cold
preservation of the organs.9 With the consent of the patient or patient's
family, physicians remove the ventilator and other life support in or near an
operating room, waiting for the pulse and respirations to cease. 6 Once that
occurs, death is declared quickly, usually within two to five minutes, and the
organ procurement process immediately begins.97 Occasionally, circulation
does not promptly cease after life support has been withdrawn.98 If
cardiopulmonary arrest does not occur within a short period of time after
removal of the ventilator, organ quality diminishes.99 Most DCD protocols
provide that if death does not occur within one hour, organ recovery will not
be carried out.' In that event, the patient is returned to a patient care unit
to await death.''
In the United States, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center was
one of the first to revisit the non-heart-beating donor as a possible source of
organs. In 1992, the transplant center produced a protocol for recovering
organs from persons who were not brain dead but who were expected to die
Maastricht categories include: 1. Dead on arrival; 2. Unsuccessful resuscitation; 3. Awaiting
cardiac arrest; and 4. Cardiac arrest while brain dead. G. Koostra et al., Categories of
Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2883, 2883 (1995). Category three
is controlled; the other categories are uncontrolled. Id. at 2893-94. A fifth uncontrolled donor
category, unexpected cardiac arrest in a critically ill patient, was recently added. Dale
Gardiner et al., Editorial, Non-Heart-Beating Donation-Solution or a Step Too Far? 62
ANESTHESIA 431, 431 (2007).
9' 1997 IOM Report, supra note 9o, at 1.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 24.
95 Id. at 26.
96 DeVita et al., supra note 57, at 1710 (describing the process of organ procurement at
the University of Pittsburg Medical Center).
97 Id.
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from cardiac arrest following the voluntary withdrawal of life support.' °2 A
central piece of this policy (commonly known as the "Pittsburgh protocol")
was that procurement of organs could not begin until the donor suffered
irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary function, which required an
observation time of two minutes following cardiac arrest before the
declaration of death could be made and the retrieval process begun.'
0 3
Concerns in the medical community about the two-minute length of
time between cessation of circulatory functions and the declaration of death
were promptly raised. An entire issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Journal was devoted to the controversies surrounding the Pittsburg
protocol.'°4 Renee Fox, who was a member of the President's Commission,
called the plan macabre and an "ignoble form of cannibalism."" 5 The
primary concern, which persists to this day, is that the period of time
between the cessation of circulation and the declaration of death is too short
to be certain the patient is irreversibly dead before organs are harvested.
Following the lead of the Pittsburgh Medical Center, the Cleveland
Clinic developed a similar proposal for recovering organs from DCD
donors.' °6 However, a professor of bioethics at Cleveland State University
went to the local county prosecutor, alleging that under the draft protocol,
the Clinic intended to hasten patients' deaths in order to procure their
organs for transplant.0 7 In March 1997, Sixty Minutes, a national television
show, aired a segment in which it claimed that patients at the Cleveland
Clinic were being killed for their organs." 8 Calling it a "matter of grave
concern," the assistant district attorney commenced an investigation into the
organ procurement policy. 9 The protocol was not implemented."0
"' University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Policy and Procedure Manual, Subject:
Management of Terminally Ill Patients Who May become Organ Donors After Death,
reprinted in PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, THE DEBATE OVER NON-HEART BEATING
CADAVER PROTOCOLS, app. at 235 (Robert M. Arnold et al., eds., 1995) [hereinafter PROCURING
ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT].
3 Id. at 240. Clinical tests to confirm death included pulselessness, apnea, and electro-
cardiographic criteria. Id.
104 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 103 (1993). The articles in this issue were later published
in PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102.
105 Renee Fox, "An Ignoble Form of Cannibalism": Reflections on the Pittsburgh
Protocolfor Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadavers, in PROCURING ORGANS
FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 155, 162.
106 GeorgeJ. Agich, From Pittsburgh to Cleveland: NHBD Controversies and Bioethics,
8 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 269, 269 (1999).
107 Id.; see also Gina Kolata, Controversy Erupts over Organ Removals, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13,1997, at A28.
,08 Agich, supra note 1o6, at 269.
109 Kolata, supra note 1o7.
..0 James M. DuBois & Michael DeVita, Donation After Cardiac Death in the United
States: How to Move Forward, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 3045, 3045 (2006) (stating that the
Cleveland Clinic DCD protocol was never implemented).
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In response to concerns about DCD, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
was asked by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 1997 to
review the medical and ethical issues associated with non-heart-beating
donation.' In its report, the IOM acknowledged the "relentlessly increasing
need for organs for patients with life-threatening organ failures .... ""' The
number of DCD donors was a very small component of the cadaveric donors:
in 1996 there were only sixty-five DCD donors out of 5,416 dead donors.113
The majority of OPOs recovered no organs from DCD donors. 4 Citing the
more than 50,000 people on the waiting list, the IOM concluded it was
unlikely that in the future, brain-dead donors or living donors would be able
to satisfy the increasing demand."5 Returning to DCD donors as a source of
organs was one way the transplant community could address the shortage
of organs. A study cited by the IOM predicted that use of controlled donors
could increase cadaver donors by at least twenty-five percent. 6
In 1997, there were twenty-nine OPOs (out of sixty-three) that had a
written DCD protocol."17 The standards for determining the irreversibility of
cardiopulmonary death varied considerably: several protocols required very
specific criteria such as confirmation of a zero pulse, apnea,"s unresponsive-
ness to verbal stimuli, and absence of electrical activity for two minutes on
the electrocardiogram (ECG).' 19 Others were vague as to the criteria for
determining death. ° Although prominent European programs required a
ten minute cessation of cardiopulmonary function before organ procure-
ment,'' U.S. guidelines were either silent or varied significantly with respect
to the period of time organ retrieval could begin after heart stoppage. Some
- 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, App. A. In addition to the criteria for determining
death, the IOM discussed ethical issues involving DCD policies and oversight, pre-and
post-mortem medical interventions, conflicts of interest, and interaction with families. Id. at
47-57, 61-63.
"I Id. at 8.
1,3 Id. at 10, 27, Table 4.1A.
114 Id. at 31.
115 Id. at 14. At the end of 1996, there were 50,047 people on the transplantation waiting
list. Id. at 11. During the same year, there were 8,940 donors, of which 5,416 were dead donors
and 3,524 were living donors. Id. at lo.
6 Id. at 30.
7 Id. at 34-35.
118 Apnea is the absence of breathing. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY n8 (28th ed. 2006).
19 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 40.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 58; see R. Schlumpf, et al., Transplantation of Kidneys from Non-Heart-
Beating Donors: Protocol, CardiacDeath Diagnosis, and Results, 28 TRANSPLANTATIONPROC.
107, 107 (1996) (stating that protocol of University of Zurich Hospital is to wait ten minutes
after the diagnosis of cardiac death before further organ retrieval procedures are imple-
mented); G. Koostra, Statement on Non-Heart-Beating Donor Programs, 27 TRANSPLANTA-
TION PROC. 2965, 2965 (1995) (reporting that the first international workshop on non-heart-
beating protocols reached consensus on a ten-minute interval after cardiac arrest to ensure
the dead donor rule).
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allowed organ retrieval immediately after cardiac arrest, while others
mandated a waiting period ranging from sixty seconds to five minutes. '22
While voicing its support for increasing the supply of organs from this
patient population, the IOM suggested that DCD policies as to the timing
and criteria for determining death be uniform among OPOs and hospitals.12 3
The IOM noted the difficulties surrounding the timing of events and the
requirement of "irreversible" cardiac death. 4 A lack of adequate safeguards
in declaring death could leave transplant programs open to charges of
orchestrating a premature death and retrieval of organs. 2 - The IOM
recommended a waiting period of at least five minutes after the cessation of
heart and lung activity as demonstrated by ECG changes consistent with
absent heart function and zero pulse activity as monitored by an arterial
catheter before a declaration of death is made and organ retrieval com-
mences.'26 A two-minute or shorter interval from cardiopulmonary cessation
to declaration of death was deemed by the IOM as too short to ensure
irreversibility. '27 The IOM's recommendation for a five-minute interval
applied solely to controlled donors who decline resuscitation after the
withdrawal of life support; no suggestions were made as to the appropriate
waiting period for uncontrolled donors, who, as the IOM noted, present a
different set of ethical and legal challenges. 8
Despite the IOM's imprimatur and the growing demand for organs, over
the next few years the process of harvesting organs from non-heart-beating
donors failed to gain wide acceptance. 9 In an effort to promote DCD and to
overcome obstacles to its implementation, the IOM issued a follow-up report
in 2000, encouraging the development of DCD protocols.' ° No new ground
was broken by this report. The IOM reiterated its original proposal for
consistency among DCD protocols in the determination of death,' 13' although
it appeared to retreat from its 1997 report recommending a five minute
interval from cardiopulmonary function until a declaration of death. In its
2000 report, the IOM recognized that "well considered" opinions may differ
on the proper interval and that a two-minute wait was acceptable. 32
122 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 40-41.
123 Id. at 48.
124 Id. at 57.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 59, 61.
127 Id. at 59.
128 Id. at 5, 50; see also infra discussion Part IV.A.
129 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that less than three percent of donors
were NHBDs and that there were only about a dozen active NHBD programs); see also DeVita,
et al., supra note 57, at 1711 (noting the lack of support for non-heart-beating donation).
130 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 2.
131 Id. at 39.
132 Id.
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Progress on DCD continued slowly. By 2003, out of sixty-nine OPOs,
twenty-five performed no DCD retrieval, and only eight OPOs recovered
organs from ten or more donors, which accounted for sixty-eight percent of
all DCD donations in the United States. 3 In 2005, a national conference of
experts ("consensus conference") was convened to assess the medical and
ethical issues surrounding DCD.'34 The participants concluded that DCD was
ethically acceptable and encouraged greater use of such protocols to increase
the number of organs available for transplantation. 35 The consensus
conference also found a short waiting period acceptable: a period of at least
two minutes but not longer than five minutes should lapse between
asystole, 6 or the lack of a heartbeat, and recovery of organs.'37 Interestingly,
rejecting the IOM's recommendation, the conference decided that it was not
necessary to confirm loss of circulatory functions by electronic monitor-
ing. 38 Thus, a person could be declared dead while still demonstrating
cardiac electrical activity on an ECG.
In spite of its efforts, the IOM recognized that in 2006, there was still
"general inertia" in implementing DCD.' 39 Noting that DCD remained
controversial, the IOM stated: "this committee believes that it is worth
examining why three IOM committees and at least two international
consensus conferences have all concluded that both controlled and uncon-
trolled [DCD] can proceed in an ethical manner yet so little has changed in
clinical practice.'
40
One of the reasons for the lagging interest in DCD has been clinical
resistance.' 4' A survey published in 2006 revealed that bedside caregivers
had numerous concerns about DCD. 4 ' Among the reservations listed by
healthcare providers at all professional levels was a perceived similarity




The lack of support for DCD may soon change. Following the efforts of
the IOM and transplant community to encourage greater use of DCD, the
Joint Commission, which accredits ninety-one percent of the nation's
'13 Richard J. Howard, A lo-Year Analysis of Organ DonationAfter Cardiac Death in
the United States, 8o TRANSPLANTATION 564, 565 (2005).
Q4 Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 281.
135 Id. at 287.
36 Asystole is defined as the absence of heart contractions. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY,
supra note 118, at 172.
,37 Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 282.
138 Id.
139 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 136.
140 Id. at 144.
"41 See M. Susan Mandell et al., National Evaluation of Healthcare Provider Attitudes
Toward Organ Donation After Cardiac Death, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2952, 2952 (2006).
141 Id. at 2955.
43 Id. The term euthanasia was not defined, and could mean either active or passive
euthanasia.
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hospitals, '44 implemented a new standard, effective January 2007, requiring
hospitals to develop policies addressing the recovery of organs from asystolic
donors.1 45 The Joint Commission does not require hospitals to provide DCD,
but if the hospital and its medical staff do not wish to implement a DCD
protocol, the hospital must justify its reasons in writing. '46 Finally, UNOS
developed model elements for a DCD policy for all OPOs and transplant
centers, which became effective July 1, 2007.147 The mainstream medical
community has seemingly put its seal of approval on DCD.'
48
III. Defining Death Under the UDDA
Despite the apparent consensus in the transplant community on the
acceptability of DCD, a growing number of physicians and ethicists have
raised concerns about this approach to recovering organs.149 With a few
notable exceptions, little attention has been given to this issue in the legal
community. 150 In addressing the current practice of DCD, it makes sense to
ask the question: does it matter whether we remove organs from those who
may not be quite dead?
144 Joint Commission Fact Sheets, Facts About Joint Commission Accreditation and
Certification, http://www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/FactSheets/facts jc acrrcert.
htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
' See Joint Comm'n of Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., The Joint Commission
Hospital Accreditation Program: Hospital Transplant Safety Standard TS.oi.oi.ol, 2
(2oo8), available athttp://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/E9943504-BFF5-42B1-
9467-79FEC1D9BD66/o/HAP TS.pdf. The provision was previously designated as a part of
Standard LD 3.110. See Joint Comm'n. on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Approved:
Revisions to Standard LD.3.n1o, 26 JOINT COMM'N PERSPS. 7 (20o6), available at
www.sharenj.org/hospital%2oprofessionals/pdf/JCAHO%2oStandardC2oLDC2o3%1""
lo.pdf.
146 Joint Commission Hospital Accreditation Program: Hospital Transplant Safety
Standard, supra note 145, at 2. The Joint Commission requirement for a hospital to justify
a decision to forego a DCD policy became effective January 1, 2008. See Joint Commission,
Approved: Revisions to Standard LD.3.11o, Element of Performance 12, for Critical Access
Hospitals and Hospitals, 27 JOINT COMM'S PERSPS. 6, 14 (2007).
147 United Network for Organ Sharing, Model Elements for Controlled DCD Recovery
Protocols, UNOS Bylaws, app. B, attachment III (2007), available athttp://www.unos.org/
policiesandBylaws2/bylaws/UNOSByLaws/pdfs/bylaw_145.pdf.
148 In 2006, a national initiative in Canada also recommended the adoption of DCD
programs, using a five minute observation period before death could be declared. See Sam D.
Shemie et al., National Recommendations for Donation After Cardiocirculatory Death in
Canada, 175 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. S1, S6 (Supp. 2006).
149 Jerry Menikoff, Less Bull, Better Bioethics, 9 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 1133,1146-47
(2005) (reviewing ALBERT R. JONSEN, BIOETHICS BEYOND THE HEADLINES: WHO LIVES? WHO
DIES? WHO DECIDES? (2005)).
'10 See, e.g., Jerry Menikoff, The Importance OfBeing Dead: Non-Heart-Beating Organ
Donation, 18 ISSUES IN LAw & MED. 3 (2002); James M. DuBois, Is Organ Procurement
Causing the Death of Patients? 18 ISSUES IN LAw & MED. 21 (2002); Jerry Menikoff, Doubts
About Death: The Silence of the Institute of Medicine, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 157 (1998).
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The "dead donor rule" has become entrenched in the transplant
community: vital organs cannot be removed from a patient who is not dead
and organ retrieval cannot be the cause of death.'"' A number of states codify
the dead donor rule. For example, Maryland's version of the UDDA states:
"A pronouncement of death under this section shall be made before anyvital
organ is removed for transplantation." ' 2 The UAGA also implicitly
recognizes that donors must be dead before organ retrieval by providing that
the gift of a vital organ is not effective until the death of the donor.5 3 The
UAGA does not define death and to determine who is dead from the absence
of either brain or cardiac activity requires looking at the state law defining
death.
15 4
A. The Meaning of "Irreversible"
In accordance with the UDDA, most states define cardiopulmonary
death as the "irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions"
as determined by accepted medical standards.' 5 Under the UDDA, death is
not merely the lack of circulation and respiration; for death to occur, those
functions must have irreversibly ceased. In recommending adoption of the
UDDA, the President's Commission noted that a clinical assessment of
irreversibility will change with new medical technology and capabilities.
According to the Commission, "Many patients declared dead fifty years ago
because of heart failure would have not experienced an 'irreversible
1' Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner, The Dead Donor Rule: Should We Stretch
It, Bend It, orAbandon It? in PROCURING ORGANS FORTRANSPLANT,supra note 102, at 220-21.
Although John Robertson is credited with coining the term, it is not altogether clear when the
dead donor rule originated. Id. at 220. The idea that a donor has to been dead before vital
organs are removed dates at least as far back as the late 1960s. Id.
"12 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202(b)(2) (West 2005); see also Ala. Code §
22-31-3(a) (LexisNexis 2006) ("When apart of a donor is proposed to be used for transplanta-
tion there shall be an independent confirmation of the death by another medical doctor
licensed in Alabama."); HAw. REV. STAT.ANN. § 327C-1(b) (LexisNexis 2008) ("Death shall be
pronounced before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation."); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:111(A) (2008) ("In any case when organs are to be used in a transplant, then
an additional physician, not a member of the transplant team, must make the pronouncement
of death."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4(C) (LexisNexis 2008) ("Death is to be pronounced before
any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation . .
53 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr AcT, supra note 59, § 2(3).
,54 Comments to the 1968 version of the UAGA state:
Subsection (b) leaves the determination of the time of death to the attending or certifying
physician. No attempt is made to define the uncertain point in time when life terminates.
The point is not subject toclear cut definition and medical authorities are currently working
toward a consensus on the matter. The real question is when have irreversible changes taken
place that preclude return to normal brain activity and self sustaining bodily functions.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1968) § 7, 8A U.L.A. 147 (2003).
155 See Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 903.
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cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions' in the hands of a modern
hospital." '
Neither the UDDA nor its state counterparts define the term irrevers-
ible. The President's Commission was concerned primarily with expanding
the concept of brain death, and failed to address what is meant by irrevers-
ibility of cardiopulmonary functions."' Further, although death is to be
determined under the UDDA according to accepted medical standards, no
uniform standard for irreversibility exists in the DCD context .15 In most
areas of medicine, determining the precise moment of death is not critical.
159
In DCD, however, minutes can mean the difference between a viable and
nonviable organ. 6 o For practical reasons, therefore, the point at which death
becomes irreversible must be avery short interval after heart stoppage; ergo,
the basis for a two to five minute waiting period.
The meaning of irreversible in the determination of death has been the
subject of much debate among physicians and medical ethicists. 6' The term
irreversible implies that more than a mere cessation of heartbeat is
necessary for one to be dead. Otherwise, people who suffer cardiac arrest
and are resuscitated are being literally brought back from the dead. On the
other hand, it is often difficult to determine the precise moment of
physiological death.'62 Physicians recognize that dying is a process that
culminates in a diagnosis of clinical death, yet the law requires a demarca-
tion between life and death-the irreversible loss of function of the
organism.16 3 James L. Bernat, lead author of the 2005 consensus conference
report, argues that death is an event, not a process.'6 4 He believes that
156 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 76.
,57 Id. at 76-77 (discussing the degree of brain damage necessary to meet irreversible
cessation of functions).
158 1997 1OM Report, supra note 90, at 61; see also Stuart J. Youngner et al., When is
"Dead"? 29 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14, 16 (1999) (noting that controversy about the meaning of
irreversibility has made it difficult to achieve consensus about the timing of death in DCD).
159 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 57.
160 Id.
,6, See, e.g., Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 16 (stating that although the term
irreversible is used in both the law and clinical practice, its exact meaning is unclear); E.T.
Bartlett, Differences Between Death and Dying, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 270, 274 (1995)
(contending that the meaning of irreversibility is unambiguous and means "not capable of
being reversed or reversing."); Tom Tomlinson, The Irreversibility of Death: Reply to Cole,
3 KENNEDY INST. OFETHICSJ., 157, 161 (1993) (asserting that irreversibility is tied to the setting
in which it is used); David J. Cole, The Reversibility of Death, 18 J. MED. ETHICS 26, 29 (1992)
(arguing that the concept of irreversibility should be abandoned because it departs from
conventional notions of death).
16' DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 77 (recognizing that determiningthe time of death
can be "troublesome").
,63 Id. (noting that "death should be 'viewed not as process but as the event that
separates the process of dying from the process of disintegration"').
64 James L. Bernat,A Defense of the Whole-Brain Concept ofDeath, 28 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 14, 15 (1998).
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"[b]ecause all organisms must be either alive or dead, death is an inherently
discontinuous and instantaneous event.'m
65
In both its 1997 and 2000 Reports, the IOM noted the difficulties
associated with the term irreversibility in DCD. "[E]xisting empirical data
cannot confirm or disprove a specific interval at which the cessation of
cardiopulmonary function becomes irreversible.'1 66 The IOM reasoned that
a five minute waiting period of time is an acceptable indication of irrevers-
ibility because a patient will not autoresuscitate after that period of time, i.e.
the patient will not resume circulation on his own without medical
assistance. 67 Although James M. DuBois asserts that "[t]he medical
community has arrived at a moral certainty that circulatory and respiratory
functions do not spontaneously resume after they have been lost more than
a couple of minutes,"'68 there is little scientific data to support this assump-
tion.' 69 The five studies on which the IOM relied were not direct studies of
autoresuscitation and were conducted in the early to mid-twentieth century,
with the last one performed in 1970.17° In 1997, the IOM recommended
further research to validate the appropriate interval necessary to exclude the
possibility of autoresuscitation.71 Those studies have not been undertaken.'72
Some critics of DCD do not dispute that the possibility of spontaneous
recovery of circulation in controlled donors withdrawn from life support is
exceedingly unlikely. 173 They do question, however, whether a body's
inability to reverse circulation on its own carries the same meaning as
irreversible cessation of function under the UDDA.74 Irreversible cessation
6I Id. at 16.
166 2000 IOM Report supra, note 20, at 22; see also 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90,
at 58 (citing a lack of scientific certainty in defining the interval for irreversibility).
167 2000 IOM Report, supra note 2o, at 22-23.
168 DuBois, supra note 150, at 32.
16, See DeVita, supra note 57, at 1710 ("The empirical data are sparse but suggest that
2 mins, rather than 5 mins, may be sufficient to ensure irreversible cessation of
cardiopulmonary function."); Youngneret al., supra note 158, at 15 (concluding thatthe data
cited by the IOM on autoresuscitation are "seriously flawed" and "provided the weakest
possible evidence for a recommendation"); Rady et al., supra note 86, at 325 (suggesting the
true incidence of autoresuscitation is unknown because of underreporting).
170 2000 IOM Report, supra note 2o, at 22-23.
'' 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 59 (stating there was a need to collect data to
conduct the appropriate interval).
172 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24 (noting that the studies it recommended had
not been undertaken); see also Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 282 (stating in 2005 consensus
conference report that studies on the minimum period of observation necessary to rule out
resuscitation had not been conducted).
173 The possibility of spontaneous circulation is an issue with uncontrolled donors in
whom resuscitation has been attempted, however. See infra note 264 and accompanyingtext.
174 See Joanne Lynn,Are the Patients Who Become Organ Donors Under thePittsburgh
Protocol for "Non-Heart-Beating Donors" Really Dead? in PROCURING ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 98-99 (stating that the two-minute waiting period in the
Pittsburg protocol may not be wrong, but it is a departure from conventional notions of
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of cardiopulmonary function can be interpreted in different ways: (1) the
patient's circulation will not spontaneously resume absent outside interven-
tion (autoresuscitation); (2) the patient's circulation will not be reversed
because the patient or family has chosen to withdraw life support and to
refuse further resuscitative efforts; or (3) the patient's circulation can not be
reversed, even with cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or other technical
means. 175 The IOM and the transplant community have chosen a combina-
tion of the first and second constructs of irreversibility: after two to five
minutes, the patient is unlikely to resume heart and lung functions on his
own and circulation will not be artificially started at the request of the
patient or family.' 76 The reason the transplant community rejects the third
meaning of irreversibility is obvious: the patient can not be irreversibly dead
when organs are procured after just two to five minutes of asystole because
many patients can be successfully resuscitated after this short an interval. 7
Although the UDDA does not define "irreversible" or address organ
donation, a few states favor a strict construction of irreversible in their death
statutes. For example, Oklahoma law provides: "A determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards; provided
however all reasonable attempts to restore spontaneous circulatory or
respiratory functions shall first be made, prior to such declaration. '1 78 The
Virginia statute also mandates that before a person is declared dead, a
physician must confirm that all further attempts at resuscitation would be
unsuccessful. 179
There is a paucity of case law on the meaning of irreversible cessation
of circulatory functions under the UDDA, but the little that exists appears to
support a definition of irreversible that is at odds with current DCD practice.
In a 1995 Michigan case, the district attorney charged the defendant with
negligent vehicular homicide of an infant born after an emergency caesarean
section. 1o The baby had no discernible heartbeat or respiratory effort for at
least ten minutes after delivery."1 Medical personnel were able to detect a
irreversibility).
,75 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24.
176 Id.
177 See infra notes 212, 213 and accompanying text.
178 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122(2) (West 2004).
,79 A person shall be medically and legally dead if there is:
the absence of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous cardiac functions and, because of
the disease or condition which directly or indirectly caused these functions to cease, or
because of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation would
not, in the opinion of such physician, be successful in restoring spontaneous life-sustaining
functions, and, in such event, death shall be deemed to have occurred at the time these
functions ceased.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (West 2005).
180 People v. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d 321, 322-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
,81 Id. at 323 (citing expert testimony that the baby's Apgar scores at one, five and ten
minutes following birth were zero, which meantthat the heartrate and respiratory effort were
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heart rate fifteen minutes after birth and gasping respirations ten minutes
later. '82 Under Michigan law, negligent homicide has to cause the death of
a person, which excludes viable fetuses not born alive.' s3 The defendant
contended he could not be charged with homicide because the infant was not
alive at birth.8 4 The court struggled with how to define "alive" and looked to
Michigan's version of the UDDA to determine if the child was born "dead. 185
The court concluded that because heart and respiratory functions were
restored, albeit many minutes after delivery, the child did not have
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions at birth.'86 The
fact that the child required medical intervention to restore circulation did
not preclude a finding that the child was born alive. "Otherwise," the court
reasoned, "the use of the word 'irreversible' becomes meaningless.' 18 7
A few other cases have reached a similar conclusion. In Jefferson
County v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (In re Johnson),'88 a
hospital appealed from a finding by county commissioners that it was not
entitled to payment for emergency resuscitation rendered to an indigent
patient"8 The commissioners found that due to an asthma attack, the
patient had suffered cardiac arrest at 5:19 p.m. and had no pulse, blood
pressure, and respirations at 5:45 p.m.190 The patient remained unrespon-
sive during transport and arrived at the hospital cyanotic 91 and incontinent
of urine and stool.'92 Despite the patient's status, the emergency room
physician began resuscitation efforts that did not cease until 6:28 p.m.'93 The
commissioners decided that because the patient was dead on arrival at the
hospital, the treatment rendered was neither reasonable nor necessary. 94
Reversing the commissioner's denial of payment, the court stated:
The only evidence which contrasted with the doctor's medical opinion was
testimony from Johnson's husband who believed that his wife had died on
their lawn while being attended by the paramedics. This lay testimony,
virtually nonexistent).
,82 Id. The infant was removed from the respirator after a few hours and declared brain
dead. Id.
183 Id. at 324. The intentional or willful killing of an "unborn quick child" is, however,
punishable as manslaughter. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 2004).
184 Selwa, 543 N.W.2d at 323.
,85 Id. at 325.
,86 See id. at 328.
,87 Id. at 328.
'8" 883 P.2d 1o84 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
I8q !d. at lo85-86.
190 Id. at lo86.
191 Cyanosis is a dark bluish color of the skin due to a lack of oxygen. STEDMAN'S MED.
DICTIONARY, supra note 118, at 475.
192 In re Johnson, 883 P.2d at 1o86.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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however, was insufficient to supplant the expert opinion of the doctor as
to whether there was a reasonable prospect that the cessation ofJohnson's
life functions could be reversed when she arrived at the hospital. 95
A recent (and rather peculiar) case nicely illustrates the ordinary
understanding of irreversibility. Prior to his wife's filing of an action for
divorce, Joseph Finnegan had suffered three heart attacks, but had been
successfully resuscitated each time.19 6 He moved to dismiss the action on the
ground the court had nojurisdiction to dissolve the marriage because he had
died on three occasions and the parties' marriage ended upon his death. 7
The court rebuffed defendant's claims, noting that he still existed and that
his "alleged deaths were neither permanent nor irreversible."' 98
The rapid declaration of death in DCD donors serves the broader goal
of increasing the supply of organs. Yet, the price of this achievement is an
acknowledgment among DCD proponents that death is contextual and
irreversibility is defined by the intent of the patient. 9 9 To satisfy the dead
donor rule, DCD proponents have to disregard the conventional understand-
ing of irreversibility, i.e. whether it is possible to reverse a cardiac arrest.
According to DCD supporters, because controlled donors choose to be
withdrawn from life support and it would be unethical, if not legally wrong,
to resuscitate these individuals, it is acceptable to construe irreversibility to
mean that we will not reverse, not that we cannot reverse, circulatory
functions. °° The irreversibility of heart function is thus a moral, not a
physiological, reality that promotes the social objectives of organ transplan-
tation.2 °'
Further evidence that irreversibility may have a different meaning in the
DCD context is the frequent substitution of the word "permanent" for
"irreversible" cessation of respiration and circulation.0 2 In accepting the
weak construal of irreversibility to mean that resuscitation will not be
195 Id. at lo87 (emphasis supplied).
196 Finnegan v. Finnegan, No. FA074031514, 2008 WL 642627, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Feb. 19, 2008) (unpublished).
197 Id.
198 Id. at *2.
,99 See DuBois, supra note 150, at 32-33 (recommending that irreversibility be
determined contextually).
200 See John Robertson, The Dead Donor Rule, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at
6, 12 ("[I]t is difficult to see why one should adopt a construal of irreversibility that ignores
whether the patient could in fact legally or morally be resuscitated."); see also Tomlinson,
supra note 161, at 162 (concluding that, in a patient who has refused life-sustaining care,
"medical means for reversing cardiopulmonary arrest are no longer ethically significant
possibilities").
'01 See Tomlinson, supra note 161, at 162-63 (distinguishing between the physiological
and functional criteria for death).
202 See 2oo6 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 146 (concluding that the term "permanent"
loss of function is a reasonable interpretation of irreversibility under the UDDA).
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attempted, the report of the 2005 Consensus Conference notes: "This
meaning of 'irreversibility' also has been called the 'permanent' cessation of
respiration and circulation. If data showthat autoresuscitation cannot occur
and if there is no attempt at artificial resuscitation, it can be concluded that
respiration and circulation have ceased permanently.
'20 3
Jerry Menikoff is highly critical of this pragmatic definition of irrevers-
ible circulatory death.20 4 He suggests that the intent of the patient plays no
role in the determination of death under the UDDA and that
cardiopulmonary function is not irreversibly lost as long as it could
conceivably be restored by resuscitation efforts. 0 Others agree. E.T. Bartlett
is critical of the Pittsburgh protocol because it confuses being dead with
dying.
Surely, no one would seriously argue that the condition of a patient, two
minutes post-arrest, who is unable on his own to return to a normal rhythm
is, ipso facto, dead. If that were true then we should now refuse CPR on
similar patients because they are dead!" 6
Alexander Morgan Capron, executive director of the President's
Commission, also argues that the weak construal of irreversibility is
inconsistent with the UDDA because there are not two kinds of death-
circulatory and neurological-but only one phenomenon based on different
criteria.0 7 "Thus," he concludes, "replacing 'irreversible cessation of
circulatory of respiratory functions' with 'we choose not to reverse' flies in
the face of the UDDA's underlying premise.
°20 8
In addition, lungs are increasingly being recovered from DCD donors
with promising results20 9 and, with the Denver Children's Hospital program,
we know there have been at least three DCD heart transplantations.210
Whatever definition of irreversibility is chosen, it seems inconsistent to say
that a person's heart and lungs irreversibly ceased when they are later
203 Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 282.
'04 See Jerry Menikoff, Doubts About Death: The Silence of the Institute of Medicine,
26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 157, 158-61 (1999).
205 Id. at 158.
206 Bartlett, supra note 161, at 274.
207 Alexander Morgan Capron, The Bifurcated Legal Standardfor Determining Death,
in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH, CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 117, 133 (Stuart J. Youngner et
al. eds., 1999).
208 Id.
209 See, e.g., David Gomez de Antonio et al., Results of Clinical Lung Transplant from
Uncontrolled Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 26 J. HEART & LUNG TRANSPLANTATION 529, 533
(2007).
211 See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 710. It is more accurate to say Denver Children's
Hospital performed three modern DCD heart transplants. The first heart transplants
performed by Christian Barnard in the late 196os took place before the concept of brain death
arose and it is not clear whether the patients satisfied brain death criteria. See MARGARET
LOCK, TWICE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF DEATH 8o, 87 (2002).
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transplanted and revived in recipients. Simply put, "[I]f a heart is restarted,
the person from whom it was taken cannot have been dead according to
cardiac criteria.""
B. Are There Two Kinds of Death Under the UDDA?
Adding to the controversy is the fact that the brain may still be
functioning in DCD donors at the time of organ procurement. Irreversible
brain damage usually does not occur within two to five minutes of
asystole."' Many patients will survive and have normal neurological function
if resuscitated at this point." '1 Even supporters of DCD admit that it may
take ten to fifteen minutes of no circulation for the brain to suffer irreparable
damage.214 New resuscitative therapies demonstrate the possibilities that a
patient may survive neurologically intact even after prolonged cardiac
arrest'15 and that the poor survival rates and neurological outcomes
associated with cardiac arrest may be due, at least in part, to outmoded
clinical practices." 6
In response to concerns that the brain is not irreversibly damaged after
two to five minutes, proponents of a short waiting period point to the
UDDA, under which, they assert, death can be determined by either the
cessation of brain or cardiopulmonary functions. 17 Thus, loss of circulation
is an independent determination of death, unrelated to whether there is
"' Robert M. Veatch, Donating Hearts After Cardiac Death-Reversing the Irreversi-
ble, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 672, 673 (2008).
2,1 See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 17 (recognizing that a four to six minute loss
of blood flow does not irreversibly damage the brainstem). See also Lynn, supra note 174, at
99 (stating that "no one" would argue that the brain would cease functioning after only two
minutes without oxygen).
21, See Lynn, supra note 174, at 99 (noting there would be a "legion" of examples of
people surviving with intact brain function after cessation of the heartbeat for two minutes).
In fact, one bioethicist has suggested that patients may not even be unconscious after only two
minutes of asystole. Robert M. Veatch, Consent for Perfusion and Other Dilemmas with
Organ Procurement from Non-Heart Beating Donors, in PROCURING ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 198.
214 See DuBois, supra note 15o, at 34 (noting that it would probably take ten to fifteen
minutes after arrest for thebrain to die); see also DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 16-17 ("If
deprived of blood flow for at least 10-15 minutes, the brain, including the brainstem, will
completely cease functioning.").
215 See Rady et al., supra note 86, at 327-28 (stating that patients resuscitated with
extracorporeal perfusion are able to recover after much longer periods than two to five
minutes of cardiorespiratory arrest); see also infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.
216 See Myron K. Weisfeldt & Lance B. Becker, Resuscitation After Cardiac Arrest, A
3-Phase Time-SensitiveMode, 288 JAMA 3035,3036 (2002) (stating that although survival
rates are poor after ten minutes of cardiac arrest, it is unknown whether this is due to
irreversible injury or the failure of current therapeutic approaches).
217 See 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24 (asserting that there is no basis for a
requirement that death by cardiopulmonary criteria must be of sufficient duration to cause
the loss of brain function).
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irreversible loss of brain function.' 8 Nonsense, says Menikoff. Accusing the
IOM of "shading the truth,"21 9 Menikoff contends the history of the UDDA
conclusively dispels the notion there are two different kinds of death. 2 '
Death occurs when the organism ceases to function as a whole, and not when
death comes to particular parts."' Citing an influential 1981 article by
Capron and Leon R. Kass,"' Menikoff states that "cardiopulmonary criteria
were being retained [in the proposed statute] precisely because they gave
clear results in the easy cases, where it was quite evident that brain function
had ceased....",," 3 The President's Commission also looked upon death as
a unitary phenomenon. 24 Consideration was given by the Commission to a
statute that would contain only a definition of brain death but circulatory
death was included as alternative criteria because "the loss of spontaneous
breathing and heartbeat are surrogates for the loss of brain functions." 5
Bernat, who today is an ardent supporter of DCD, previously criticized
the Pittsburgh protocol because it was not clear the donors were brain dead
after only two minutes.226 He stated:
Tests measuring circulation for the patient not receiving cardiopulmo nary
support assess the prolonged absence of heartbeat (asystole or ventricular
fibrillation) and the prolonged absence of breathing (apnea). These are
adequate tests for death in this context because they lead directly to the
destruction of the brain and all other organs. The cessation of heartbeat
and breathing must be prolonged because their absence must be of
sufficient duration for the brain to become diffusely infarcted and for the
cessation of heartbeat and breathing conclusively to be irreversible.2 27
Similarly, one of the originators of DCD, the Maastrich University
Hospital in The Netherlands, rejects the Pittsburgh protocol, preferring
instead a ten-minute waiting time before organ procurement "to be sure that
the patient's brain is irreversibly damaged and an equivalent situation to
brain death has been reached." 8
,o8 Id.; see also Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 281 (stating that the cardiopulmonary
standard may be used when the donor can not meet brain death criteria).
9 Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162.
210 Id. at 16o.
221 See Alexander Morgan Capron, The Report of the President's Commission on the
Uniform Determination of DeathAct, in DEATH: BEYOND WHOSE BRAIN CRITERIA, supra note
51, at 156.
222 See Capron & Kass, supra note 46, at 113-14.
223 Menikoff, supra note 204, at 159-6o.
224 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 7.
225 Id. at 37.
226 Bernat, supra note 164, at 20.
227 Id.
228 Koostra et al., supra note 91, at 2893.
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Intertwined with the problematic issue of whether controlled donors
have irreversible brain functions is the increasing post-mortem use of
artificial resuscitation to ensure viability of the organs. One technique used
to preserve organs in the donor is extracorporeal membrane oxygenation
(ECMO), where blood is circulated through an oxygenating system.22 9
ECMO, which is a modification of the heart-lung machine used during
bypass surgery, is often employed as a resuscitative intervention in those
who have experienced cardiac arrestY.3 In DCD, however, ECMO is begun
after the patient is declared dead to restore blood flow and to preserve the
organs.2 31 Once the heart is perfused with oxygen through ECMO, it may
begin to beat again. 32 A recent editorial in Anesthesia, a British journal,
described an "astonished audience" at an international conference in
London in 2006 when it heard that a medical center in the United States was
experimenting with ECMO after only two minutes of pulseless activity,
resulting in reanimation of the heart. 3 As critics have pointed out, claiming
that the patient has died and then reversing the circulatory arrest seems to
profoundly misapply the irreversibility requirement. 34
Michael A. DeVita acknowledges that a problem in non-heart-beating
donation is that brain function can return after cardiac arrest if resuscitative
attempts restore circulation within five to ten minutes. The practice of
restoring circulation through ECMO or other techniques raises the
possibility that the brain is also being resuscitated while the recovery of
organs is ongoing.36 Some advocates of DCD nevertheless encourage
229 See Joseph F. Magliocca et al., Extracorporeal Support for Organ Donation After
Cardiac Death Effectively Expands the Donor Pool, 58 J. TRAUMA 1095, 1096-97 (2005).
230 David Bracco et al., The Thin Line Between Life and Death, 33 INTENSIVE CARE MED.
751, 751 (2007).
231 Magliocca et al., supra note 229, at 1O96.
232 Carla DeJohn & Joseph B. Zwischenberger, Ethical Implications of Extracorporeal
Interval Supportfor Organ Retrieval, 52 AM. Soc'Y ARTIFICIAL INTERNAL ORGANS J. 119, 121
(2006); see also Magliocca et al., supra note 229, at 1097.
233 Dale Gardiner et al., supra note 91, at 432-33.
234 Joanne Lynn & Ronald Cranford, The Persisting Perplexities in the Determination
ofDeath, inTH E DEFINITION OFDEATH CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, supra note 207, at 1o6
(stating that restoring circulation after a determination of death is evidence of "confused
thinking" and a misapplication of the criteria for irreversibility).
235 DeVita et al., supra note 57, at 1711. Michael DeVita is a professor at the University
of Pittsburgh School of Medicine. Id. at 1709. See also Christopher James Doig & Graham
Rocker, Retrieving Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donors: A Review of Medical
and Legal Issues, 50 CAN. J. ANESTHESIA 1069, 1072 (2003) (suggesting that if circulatory
functions and blood flow to the brain are restored, it is possible that patients could experience
pain or even regain consciousness).
236 Joseph L. Verheijde et al., Recovery of Transplantable Organs After Cardiac or
Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ Donation, 2
PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS & HUMANITIES IN MED. 1, 3 (2007) (asserting that post-mortem
technology to preserve organs results in the resuscitation of the heart and brain), available
at http://www.peh-med.com/content/pdf/1747-5341-2-8.pdf.
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resuscitation of victims of cardiac arrest for the sole purpose of preserving
organ viability for procurement. 37 The New York City organ recovery
program envisions the transplant ambulance team continuing CPR and
administering oxygen to the victim who had previously been declared dead
in order to maintain blood flow during transport to the hospital.23' This
raises the specter of limited brain resuscitation. 39 Critics argue that if
transplant surgeons are to use artificial means to restore circulation, it
becomes imperative to wait in excess of ten minutes to confirm the total
cessation of the entire brain before ECMO or other techniques are used.2 40
Otherwise, it may be possible for at least some patients to regain brain
functions, including awareness or the perception of pain.
41
C. A Not So Uniform Determination of Death
In adopting the weaker construct of irreversibility, the transplant
community has embraced a definition of death that is conducive to organ
procurement but is at odds with the UDDA and the intentions of the
President's Commission. For example, patients A and B are both in the
intensive care unit.242 A is a potential donor and refuses CPR. Patient B has
stated that he wants CPR if he arrests. According to current DCD practice,
A can be declared dead after at least two minutes of cardiopulmonary arrest.
237 See, e.g., Mary Bennett & Niranjan Kissoon, Is Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
Warranted in Children Who Suffer Cardiac Arrest Post Trauma? 23 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY
CARE 267, 271 (2007) (stating that the possibility of organ donation may be a reason to
attempt a prolonged resuscitation); see also 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 158
("[P]remature removal of mechanical support can be a major barrier to organ donation.").
238 Stein, supra note 3, at Aol.
239 M.D.D. Bell,Non-HeartBeating Organ Donation: Old Procurement Strategy-New
EthicalProblems, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 176,179 (stafingthatthe combination of cardiac massage
and administration of oxygen after death "maybe associated with some restoration of brain
functions").
240 Verheijde et al., supra note 236, at 3. To assuage the concerns of medical personnel
about post-mortem beating of theheart, some transplant centers use a thoracic aortic balloon
or lidocaine to prevent reanimation of the heart during ECMO. See DeJohn &Zwischenberger,
supra note 232, at 121. Using a thoracic balloon will also prevent perfusion to the brain, thus
avoiding the problem of brain resuscitation during ECMO. Bernat, supra note 14, at 671.
241 This is theoretical, of course, because once organs are removed and the patient dies,
we cannot know whether the patient had any such experience. There is also a debate in the
medical community about whether it is possible for patients to regain cognition or experience
pain after only five minutes of absent blood flow. See Martha A. Q.Curley et al., Letters to the
Editor, Organ Donation After Cardiac Death: Are We Willing toAbandon the Dead Donor
Rule? The Author's Reply, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 507, 508 (2007) (stating that
studies show patients' cognition and the ability to perceive pain are likely absent after five
minutes of no cardiac output); Doig & Rocker, supra note 235, at 1072 (questioning whether
patientsin DCD protocols could experience pain or regain consciousness when brain perfusion
is restored by mechanical means).
242 This scenario is adapted from a similar hypothetical described in Youngner et al.,
supra note 158, at 17.
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B also suffers two minutes of asystole and apnea, but resuscitative efforts are
started. Is B dead after two minutes? If B is successfully resuscitated, was he
brought back from the dead, or was he not dead in the first place? The
answer under the UDDA is that B is not dead because he did not suffer
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions. Using the
weaker construal of irreversibility only for organ donors but not for other
patients who suffer cardiac arrest contravenes the purpose of the UDDA,
which was to set uniform criteria for the determination of death in all
individuals. As the President's Commission commented:
[S]ince the proposed statute is intended to apply in all situations, it ought
not to be incorporated into a state's Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).
Placing it there would create the mistaken impression that a special
"definition" of death needs to be applied to organ transplantation, which
is not the case. 43
DCD advocates point out that under the UDDA, the determination of
death is to be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. Since
the medical community has found DCD ethical, they reason, it falls within
the standard of care. 44 But declaring a person dead after two to five minutes
of absent circulation is not the medical standard of care for all patients. 45
For those who experience sudden cardiac arrest, aggressive resuscitation is
the rule.46 Under the UDDA, proof of death is both a medical and legal
question. 47 The question for medical experts is whether there is biological
evidence of life (or death), not whether the patient has chosen to live or
die. 48 There is no separate test of death for organ transplant purposes.249
Further, to argue that the medical criteria for determining death have
evolved since the 1980s in an effort to shorten the time in which death is
243 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 80. Neither does the UAGA purport to define
death for purposes of organ transplantation. Id. at 145.
144 See DuBois, supra note 150, at 33.
145 Kimmo Sainio,Are Non-Heart-Beating Donors Really Dead? 29 ANNALS MED. 473,
474 (1997) (noting that in an emergency room, a patient with unexpected asystole would not
be declared dead after two minutes).
246 See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
247 Randles v. Ind. Patient's Comp. Fund, 860 N.E.2d 1212, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
248 See id. ("[I]t is the role of the medical professional to decide whether brain death or
other cessation of cardiopulmonary function is present in accordance with current medical
standards") (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D Death § 424); see also UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH
ACT (1980), supra note 17, prefatory note ("Time of death is a fact to be determined with all
others in each individual case, and may be resolved, when in doubt, upon expert testimony
before the appropriate court.").
249 See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588,595 (Fla. 1992) (finding that anencephalic infant
who lacked higher brain functions could not be declared legally dead for purposes of organ
donation).
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diagnosed is to stand medical progress on its head. 5 ° If anything, recent
resuscitative techniques have demonstrated that some individuals whom
physicians would have declared dead even a few years ago can survive and
lead productive lives.51
The goal of increasing organs for transplantation is worthwhile, but
whether there ought to be different definitions of death, depending on the
context, is an issue that deserves greater scrutiny and public discussion
before DCD attains widespread use. There is also some value in treating all
individuals equally. "Otherwise," commentators have noted, "patients would
be dead or alive, depending on whether or not they were organ donors.""25
The lack of consistency among hospital protocols in the pronouncement
of death is also troublesome.5 3 If Sue is withdrawn from life support in
Pittsburg, she is dead after two minutes without evidence of cardiac activity.
If Sue is in Shreveport, Louisiana, she will not be declared irreversibly dead
until five minutes transpire after asystole. 5 4 In other words, in Shreveport,
Sue is just mostly dead after two minutes and her organs cannot be
recovered while, in Pittsburg, Sue is really dead and her organs can be taken.
In 1997, the IOM criticized as "uncomfortable" a situation where a donor
could be considered dead in one OPO region while defined as alive in
another. 5 15 Nevertheless, just three years later, the IOM countenanced such
inconsistencies when it concluded that there was "room for significant
differences of opinion" on the interval required to assure the irreversibility
of circulatory functions.256 This leaves patients or families who are consider-
ing donation in a disconcerting situation where they may not know or be
able to choose which version of "death" will be applied to them.
Such variations in the timing of death do not engender confidence in the
organ transplant system, which depends on the trust of potential donors and
their families that a physician will not prematurely declare them dead to
harvest organs. It also does not comport with the UDDA, which envisioned
that there would be a uniform definition of death in every jurisdiction.
250 See 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 146 (asserting that evolving medical
standards support the weak construal of irreversibility).
251 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
252 Stuart J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold, Philosophical Debates About the Definition
of Death: Who Cares? 26 J. MED. & PHIL. 527, 531 (2001).
253 See Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 20 (arguing for uniformity among protocols
to avoid public criticism).
254 LA. STATE UNIV. HEALTH SCI. CTR.-SHREVEPORT, ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC
DEATH (DCD) PROTOCOL LOUISIANA ORGAN PROCUREMENT AGENCY (LOPA) 4 (2oo8),
http://www.sh.lsuhsc.edu/policies/policy manuals-via ms-word/hospital policy/h_5.7
.i.pdf.
255 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 59.
256 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 39.
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IV. The Expansion of DCD in
Uncontrolled Donors and Children
Does this academic discussion about the time of death in DCD matter?
Those prospective donors who are voluntarily withdrawn from life support
in a hospital are not going to be resuscitated and their brain function will
soon be irretrievably lost due to lack of cardiac function. In other words, in
a few more minutes, they are going to be all dead, not just mostly dead. At
least a persuasive utilitarian argument can be made that we should remove
their organs to benefit those desperatelyin need of "the gift of life" while the
organs are still useful. Yet, as the NewYork City proposal for organ recovery
ambulances demonstrates, DCD practices are also being applied to victims
who suffer cardiac arrest outside the hospital. Children are also viewed as
potential DCD donors; indeed, doctors conducted the first DCD pediatric
heart transplants quite recently. There are compelling reasons, however,
why organ procurement from uncontrolled donors and children should
proceed slowly.
A. Uncontrolled Donors
Most current DCD protocols in the United States focus on the controlled
donor as the time of cardiopulmonary arrest is known and warm ischemia
time can be minimized through careful planning of the organ procurement
process.25 7 However, uncontrolled donors, i.e., those who suffer an
unexpected or sudden cardiac arrest and who are not brain dead, may
comprise the largest group of untapped donors.', 8 Approximately
thirty-eight percent of all deaths occur outside a hospital. 59 The IOM
estimates that if persons undergoing unsuccessful resuscitation were
considered as potential organ donors, there could be an additional 22,000
cadaveric donors each year.6o
There is a "powerful potential conflict" between the interest of the
prospective uncontrolled donor in a thorough and lengthy resuscitative
effort and the interest of the future recipient in a viable organ procured soon
after cardiac arrest.261 If DCD is expanded to potential uncontrolled donors,
will physicians wait only two to five minutes after cessation of cardiac and
pulmonary functions before removing organs? The New York City proposal
257 Controlled donors werethe primary focus of the 1997 and 2000 IOM Reports and the
2005 consensus conference.
258 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 154 (citing an estimate of 335,oo deaths a year
due to sudden cardiac arrest).
259 Akinlolu 0. Ojo et al., Quantifying Organ Donation Rates byDonation ServiceArea,
5 Am. J. TRANSPLANTATION 958,961(2005).
26o 20o6 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 156.
261 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 60.
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suggests that the same standard will apply: organ recovery ambulances will
begin organ preservation methods five minutes after death is declared in the
field. 62
With the controlled donor, the patient or family has chosen to forego
resuscitative measures and, in the absence of autoresuscitation, is dead (or
at least soon will be dead). But with the uncontrolled donor, there is no
presumption that resuscitation is not desired. The American HeartAssocia-
tion's current resuscitation guidelines state that "all patients in cardiac
arrest should receive resuscitation," unless one of three criteria is met: the
patient has a do-not-resuscitate order, the patient has signs of irreversible
death such as rigor mortis, or no physiological benefit will be expected.26 3 In
other words, "irreversibility" in the context of uncontrolled donors means
that circulation cannot be restarted with current medical technology.
The claim that a DCD donor is irreversibly dead because there is no
possibility of self-resuscitation after a two-minute period of asystole is also
suspect when applied to victims of sudden cardiac arrest who undergo CPR.
The medical literature speaks of the "Lazarus phenomenon," where patients
who have been declared dead after unsuccessful resuscitation have a
delayed, unexpected return of spontaneous circulation. 6 4 The time from
termination of CPR to return of spontaneous circulation in these patients
ranges from a few minutes to as long as twenty minutes with functional
recovery.265 Some of these cases of "resurrection" have received widespread
public attention. For example, Richard Selzer, a surgeon, wrote about his
recovery after being declared dead. 66 While in the ICU, Selzer experienced
a cardiac arrest . 6 7 Despite vigorous resuscitation, he had no heartbeat and
a flat tracing on an ECG for over four and a half minutes. 6 8 The attending
nurse entered the time of death and ten minutes later observed body
characteristics compatible with death.26 9 Suddenly, Selzer began to breathe,
262 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
263 2005American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
and Emergency Cardiovascular Care, Part 2: Ethical Issues, 112 CIRCULATION IV-6, IV-7
(2005), available at http:// circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/reprint/112/24-suppl/IV-6.
264 See Vedamurthy Adhiyaman et al., The Lazarus Phenomenon, J. ROYAL Soc. MED.
552, 552 (2007) (stating that there have been thirty-eight reported cases in the medical
literature of delayed spontaneous return of circulation). The article also cited a number of
media reports in which patients were declared dead, but were later found alive. Id. at 555.
265 Id. at 553, Table 1; see also Antti Kamarainen et al., Spontaneous Defibrillation After
Cessation of Resuscitation in Out-Of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest: A Case of Lazarus
Phenomenon, 75 RESUSCITATION 543, 544 (2007) (describing the case of a man in a body bag
who was observed breathing spontaneously fifteen minutes after resuscitation ended).
266 LOCK, supra note 210, at 54-55.
267 Id. at 55.
268 Id.
269 Id.
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tracing returned to the ECG, and the heartbeat became regular. °7 On his
discharge from the hospital, Selzer stated, "Next time hold a feather to my
lips. It's more reliable." 7' These cases are uncommon,2 7' but they raise
serious questions about whether very brief intervals between the cessation
of CPR and the process of organ recovery should be used in uncontrolled
donation when resuscitation efforts have been previously attempted. 7 3 To
exclude the possibility of an errant diagnosis of death, several commentators
have recommended that patients be observed for at least ten minutes after
CPR has ended before confirming death to rule out the possibility of a
delayed return of spontaneous circulation. 4 Otherwise, it may be the
removal of organs that makes the uncontrolled donor's cessation of
circulatory functions "irreversible."
New resuscitative techniques also hold much promise for those who
suffer prolonged cardiac arrest and have made it more difficult to determine
when there is an irreversible cessation of circulatory functions that would
justify termination of CPR. Survival rates in individuals who suffer sudden
cardiac arrest have historically been dismal. With out-of-hospital CPR,
survival ranges between five and twenty-one percent. 75 In-hospital CPR
results in an average fifteen percent survival rate.76 Many of those surviving
have poor neurological outcomesY.7 By using cardiopulmonary bypass as
part of integrated resuscitative therapy, a recent study demonstrated a
seventy-nine percent survival rate in thirty-four victims with prolonged
270 Id.
271 Id. (quoting RICHARD SELZER, RAISING THE DEAD 99 (1994)).
272 The true incidence of Lazarus phenomenon may be unknown because of under-
reporting. Adhiyaman et al., supra note 264, at 552; see also Wolfgang H. Maleck et al.,
Unexpected Return of Spontaneous Circulation After Cessation of Resuscitation (Lazarus
Phenomenon), 39 RESUSCITATION 125, 127 (1998) (suggesting that the true incidence of the
phenomenon may be fairly high and that its underreporting is due to legal concerns).
273 The Lazarus phenomenon is by definition applicable to those who have previously
been subjected to resuscitation efforts and, therefore, would not apply to controlled donors
who have chosen to forego CPR. See Sam D. Shemie, Clarifying the Paradigm for the Ethics
of Donation and Transplantation: Was "Dead"Really So Clear Before Organ Donation? 2
PHIL., ETHICS&HUMAN. INMED. 1,4(2007), available athttp://www.peh-med.com/content/
pdf/1747-5341-2-18.pdf.
174 Adhiyaman et al., supra note 264, at 555 (recommending that patients be passively
monitored for at least ten minutes, if not longer, after the cessation of CPR); Kamarainen et
al., supra note 265, at 545 (advocating minimum of ten minutes of monitoring to rule out
Lazarus phenomenon).
"I Constantine L. Athanasuleas et al., Sudden Cardiac Death: Directing the Scope of
Resuscitation Towards the Heart and Brain, 70 RESUSCITATION 44, 45 (2006).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 45, 47.
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cardiac arrest,"7s with minimal neurological damage.2 79 Although this was a
small patient population, the authors conclude that "[r]ecovery without
adverse neurological outcomes is possible in a large number of cardiac arrest
victims following prolonged manual CPR."280 Another report documents the
usefulness of ECMO in refractory cardiac arrest, including the case of a
four-year-old boy who had undergone three hours of CPR before ECMO was
started.28 ' He survived and had normal neurological function on discharge
from the hospital.2"' Additional studies confirm the significant strides in
survival rates made possible by resuscitation through ECMO,
cardiopulmonary bypass, or hypothermia (cooling of the body tempera-
ture). 8' One commentator suggests that with current technology, the limits
of brain resuscitation after cardiac arrest can not be definitively established:
In reality, the duration of circulatory arrest that precludes recovery of any
residual amount of brain function is unknown but is lengthening.
Although arrest time is paramount, the conditions of the cardiac arrest
(temperature) and the manner in which the circulation is re-established
(e.g., hypertensive reperfusion, hypothermia, neuroprotective agents) will
extend the time for potential recovery of various degrees of brain function
well beyond lo minutes.'
8 4
The success of these new interventions raises difficult questions about
who decides whether a person arriving in the emergency room after cardiac
arrest will be subjected to techniques like ECMO to reverse the cardiac arrest
or will be declared dead and then have ECMO to preserve the organs for
donation. In essence, "Where is the line between refractory cardiac arrest-
making the patient a potential candidate for ECLS [extracorporeal life
support] and irreversible cardiac arrest-making the patient a potential
organ donor?" 8 ,
278 The patients in the study had experienced periods of refractory cardiac arrest ranging
from twenty minutes to one and one-half hours. Id. at 46-47.
279 Id. at49 (stating that only two of the thirty-four patients had an adverse neurological
outcome).
280 Id. at 45.
281 Bracco et al., supra note 230, at 751.
282 Id.
283 See Massimo Massetti et al., Back from Irreversibility: ExtracorporealLife Support
for Prolonged Cardiac Arrest, 79 ANN. THORACIC SURGERY 178, 181 (2005) (demonstrating
increased survival rates in patientswith refractory cardiac arrestwho received extracorporeal
support); Weisfeldt & Becker, supra note 216, at 3037 (citing several studies showing an
advantage in survival rates when controlled reperfusion or hypothermia are used).
284 Shemie, supra note 273, at 3. See also Lynn & Cranford, supra note 234, at lo9
(recommending a delay of at least ten minutes to avoid potential error in diagnosing death in
individuals undergoing resuscitation).
285 Bracco et al., supra note 230, at 753.
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Even some supporters of DCD question whether the weak construal of
irreversibility in controlled donors who choose not to be resuscitated should
apply in other contexts. DuBois calls for a "stricter sense of irreversibility"
in situations that do not involve the controlled donor.286 In 1997, the IOM
similarly warned that where death is unexpected or sudden, longer periods
of observation may be necessary to ensure that the cardiac arrest is truly
irreversible.Y7yet seven years later, without explanation, the IOM suggested
that with uncontrolled donors, a hands-off period between the end of
resuscitation and transfer to an organ transplant team may not even be
necessary.288
Finally, it is questionable whether waiting ten minutes or slightly longer
after an absent heartbeat for organ procurement is detrimental to viability
of the organs. One of the oldest DCD programs is at the Hospital Clinico San
Carlos in Madrid, Spain, where most of the non-heart-beating donors are
adults who suffer cardiac arrest outside the hospital.28 9 The Madrid criteria
include a requirement that the heartbeat must be absent for at least ten
minutes after CPRis stopped. 90 Despite this waiting period, transplantation
of kidneys from uncontrolled DCD donors have long-term outcomes similar
to those of organs from brain-dead donors.2 9' The University of Zurich,
another program that has been using kidney transplants from
non-heart-beating donors since the mid-198os, has also demonstrated that
using a ten minute interval between cardiopulmonary arrest and organ
procurement does not impair long-term graft survival rates. 92 Waiting
slightly longer to recover organs may diminish their quality but that seems
a price most people would be willing to pay to ensure that they are not
prematurely declared dead.
286 DuBois, supra note 15o, at 33; see also Veatch, supra note 213, at 197 (suggesting the
question of whether a patient is dead after two minutes of asystole may not be important in
uncontrolled donors, but would "raise serious problems" in patients who suffer sudden cardiac
arrest).
287 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 58. See also Veatch, supra note 213, at 197-98
(recommending periods of pulselessness longer than two minutes to establish irreversibility).
288 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 152-53.
289 Ana I. Sanchez-Fructuoso et al., Victims of Cardiac Arrest Occurring Outside the
Hospital: A Source of Transplantable Kidneys, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 157, 157(2006).
The clinic began its DCD program in 1989. Id.
290 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 139.
291 Sanchez-Fructuoso et al., supra note 289, at 162. Organs other than kidneys may
have poorer results. Id. at 162-63.
292 Markus Weber et al., Kidney Transplantation from Donors Without a Heartbeat,
347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 248, 248, 255 (2002). From 1985 until 1995, the hospital initiated
organ retrieval five minutes after cardiac arrest. Beginning in 1995, it instituted a ten minute
waiting period. Id. at 249; see also Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162 (citing to studies that
indicated a longer waiting period would not impair the usefulness of organs).
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B. Children
Although DCD has been primarily used in adult donors, there are calls
for expanding its use in pediatric populations.2 93 The need for new sources
of pediatric organs is particularly acute as the number of brain-dead donors
in the pediatric population is decreasing due to improvements in resuscita-
tion and rehabilitation. 94 Concerns have been voiced, however, as to
whether the same criteria used in adult DCD should apply to children.
95
DeVita, one of the leading proponents of DCD, has questioned whether
adult DCD protocols are appropriate for children because children may
tolerate prolonged circulatory collapse. 296 Current American Heart Associ-
ation resuscitation guidelines make the same observation. 97 Others have
suggested that the risk of autoresuscitation may be variable in the pediatric
population.9 8 There is also a heightened potential for conflicts of interest in
pediatric DCD. Unlike the adult patient population in which the pa-
tient-donor is in a specialty critical care unit treated by one set of physicians
and the potential recipient is at another location treated by another set of
physicians, most potential pediatric donors are in multidisciplinary units,
in which the same team may take care of both the potential donor and
recipient. 99 This arrangement leads to "[t]he prospect of having to advise
one set of parents that they should consider withdrawal of [life] support
because of devastating brain injury while other patients in the same unit
might become recipients of the newly deceased child's organs seems highly
troubling to some intensivists." '° This situation raises questions about
conflicts inherent in terminating resuscitative efforts in the child donor. °1
293 See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 713, 714 (encouraging pediatric heart transplanta-
tion from DCD donors); Amy L. Durall et al., Potentialfor Donation After Cardiac Death in
a Children's Hospital, 119 PEDIATRICS 219, 221 (2007) (noting that the experience with DCD
in pediatrics hospitals is "quite small"); Nikoleta S. Kolovos et al., Donation After Cardiac
Death in Pediatric Critical Care, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 47,47(2007) (stating that
DCD may increase the number of pediatric organs for donation).
114 Margaret Ferguson & Jeannie Zuk, Organ Donation After Cardiac Death: A New
Trend in Pediatrics, 37 J. PEDIATRIC GASTROENTEROLOGY & NUTRITION 219, 219 (2003).
295 The transplantation of hearts from three DCD donors by a team at Denver Children's
Hospital raises questions not only about applying DCD protocols to children, but also whether
hearts can ethically and legally be removed from adult or child DCD donors. See infra note 315
and accompanying text.
096 DeVita et al., supra note 49, at 1712.
297 2005 American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
and Emergency Cardiovascular, Part 2: Ethical Issues, supra note 253, at IV-7 (noting that
intact survival in children after prolonged resuscitation has been documented).
098 See, e.g., Joel E. Frader, Deconstructing Donation After Cardiac Death, 8 PEDIATRIC
CRITICAL CARE MED. 76, 77 (2007) (stating that the pediatric community needs to study
whether the risk of autoresuscitation varies with age).
299 Id.
300 Id.
3o1 See Bernat, supra note 14, at 670 (noting that conflicts are more of a concern where
the potential donor is a child).
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In some children's hospitals, the rush to expand pediatric DCD faces an
unenthusiastic clinical staff.3 2 This may be due to the lack of pediatric DCD
programs and the unfamiliarity of staff with this type of organ donation.30 3
The reluctance of pediatric care providers to embrace DCD may also reflect
wariness in forging ahead on a new form of organ donation where there are
many unanswered questions, including the appropriate time interval
304 thbetween the cessation of cardiac function and organ recovery. With the
mandates of The Joint Commission and UNOS for all hospitals and
transplant centers to develop DCD policies, its use in pediatric institutions
deserves more scrutiny.
V. Is DCD Causing the Death of Donors?
The most serious criticism of DCD is that the removal of organs after
two to five minutes of asystole causes the death of donors and is tantamount
to murder.305 This is a complex issue, particularly with controlled donors
who have a constitutionally protected right to withdraw life-sustaining
care.3°6 Modern law recognizes the difference between killing and being
allowed to die.30 7 The removal of life support provides the condition for
death; once the heart stops, the body can no longer supply the means of
sustaining life and death through lack of oxygen to the brain follows.
Hastening death by the removal of life support with the patient's consent is
not unlawful.308 The question presented by DCD is whether the act of organ
302 See, e.g., Martha A. Q. Curly, Pediatric Staff Perspectives on Organ DonationAfter
Cardiac Death in Children, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 212, 216-18 (2007).
303 Id.
304 Id. at 217 (reporting that thirty-eight percent of survey participants favored basing
the determination of death on the absence of brain activity, while sixty percent approved an
average waiting period after cardiac cessation of five minutes and a range of two to ten
minutes); see also Frader, supra note 298, at 77 (calling for further research on DCD in
pediatric hospitals).
305 See Joan McGregor et al., Do Donation After Cardiac Death Protocols Violate
Criminal Homicide Statutes? 27 MED. & L. 241, 251 (2008) (contending that the removal of
organs prior to brain death may be the proximate cause of death); Michael Potts, Truthfulness
in Transplantation: Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation, 2 PHIL., ETHICS & HUMAN. IN MED.
1, 2 (2007), available athttp://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/17 (calling for a ban on DCD
because the donor is not dead until the organs are removed); Veatch, supra note 211, at 673
(asserting that removing a heart from a DCD donor after seventy-five seconds is "ending a life
by organ removal").
306 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (199o) (stating that a
competent person's liberty interest in refusing treatment could be inferred from the Court's
prior decisions).
307 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793,807 (1997) ("This Court has also recognized, at least
implicitly, the distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die.").
08 Id. at 802-03.
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recovery in donors in the minutes before brain death alters that legal
principle.
Menikoff argues that, at least with controlled donors, it is not organ
retrieval that factually causes death; it is the loss of oxygen to the brain
caused by removal of the ventilator .3 9 The intervening removal of organs
during the process of dying does not affect the timing of brain death, which
is occurring because of lack of blood flow. 310 Since controlled donors will not
be resuscitated, it is only a matter of time before irreversible death occurs,




Even if organ procurement does not cause death in the controlled
donor, a precept of the dead donor rule is that vital organs cannot be
removed before a person is dead.312 DCD donors may verywell be alive at the
time organs are removed. In controlled donors, this may not be significant
because they have chosen to forego life support and likely will not survive
even if organ removal is not performed. For those who suffer unexpected
cardiac arrest and who have not made their end-of-life wishes known,
however, the rush to procure organs is worrisome. Recent studies indicate
that there are many victims of sudden cardiac arrest who, provided with
appropriate therapy, survive after prolonged periods of cardiac arrest and,
therefore, should not be considered dead after only two to five minutes of
absent circulation.313 For at least some victims of sudden cardiac arrest,
whether in or out of a hospital, a decision to begin organ procurement
minutes after stopping CPR deprives them of an opportunity to reverse the
arrest, which may be considered a hastening or direct cause of their demise.
As the IOM recognized in 1997, prematurely abandoning resuscitation in the
uncontrolled donor so that organ recovery can proceed "may forfeit the life
of a patient who is otherwise a salvageable, competent person.'14
Also troublesome are the removal of hearts from DCD donors and their
reanimation in recipients. As Veatch has pointed out, how can irreversible
cardiac death be diagnosed when the functions of the heart are later
reversed?315 The use of ECMO to restart circulation in a person declared
dead because of irreversible cessation of circulation raises the same concern.
Although it may be true that in most cases, withdrawal of life support and
the accompanying cessation of breathing and circulation are the cause of
death, this hypothesis does not account for cases in which circulation is
309 Menikoff, supra note 15o, at 162.
310 Id.
311 Id.; see also James L. Bernat,Are Organ Donors After Cardiac Death Really Dead?
17 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 122, 127 (2006) (agreeing with Menikoff that organ donation does not
hasten death in controlled donors).
3,2 Menikoff, supra note 15o, at 162.
313 See discussion supra Part III.A.
314 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 49.
315 Veatch, supra note 211, at 673.
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restored after "death." If blood flow is restored through artificial means
shortly after the declaration of cardiac death, there is a possibility of brain
resuscitation.36 Thus, it would seem that surgeons need to postpone organ
recovery until brain death occurs. 7 As one commentator explains, "If the
state of death is reversed, then harvesting organs from the reanimated
patient prior to death occurring a second time is failure to respect the dead
donor rule: it constitutes restoring life and killing."3'8
Absent reanimation of the patient, however, it would be an onerous task
for a prosecutor to bring homicide charges because of the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of proving at what point in the organ procurement process the
dying patient was alive or had reached the point of irreversibility. Patients'
clinical conditions vary and so does the speed at which they die after cardiac
arrest. Potential controlled donors who are taken off life support and who
are already severely neurologically compromised may die sooner than those
who have not suffered a prior brain insult.3 19 Controlled and uncontrolled
donors who have an intact brain prior to cardiac arrest may have a more
prolonged process of dying.32 0 Although there may be clear-cut cases in
which a patient's death is hastened by organ recovery, in most cases, there
are probably too many unknowns in locating the precise moment of death
that, with the high burden of proof, would negate criminal prosecution of
physicians who practice DCD.32'
Further, there may not be the sense of public outrage over DCD that
would spur a prosecutor to examine homicide charges.32 2 Like many experts,
the public may believe that it is acceptable to procure organs from patients
voluntarily removed from life support who may not be quite dead-after all,
they will be dead shortly. Norman Fost suggests that Americans have little
interest in esoteric arguments about life and death in organ donation, noting
that when concerns about DCD in controlled donors were raised by the
316 McGregor et al., supra note 305, at 250.
37 See id., at 251 (recommending a waiting time of fifteen to twenty minutes until brain
death).
3' James M. DuBois, Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation: A Defense of the Required
Determination of Death, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 126, 130 (1999).
319 See Rady et al., supra note 86, at 327 (recognizing that although donors who have
preexisting neurological injuries may not have meaningful brain activity at the time of arrest,
the same may not be true of potential donors who have intact brain function prior to arrest).
320 Id.
32 The California transplant surgeon who allegedly administered excessive and
unnecessary medication is not being prosecuted for homicide, but for dependent adult abuse
and prescribing a controlled substance without a medical purpose. McKinley, supra note 28,
at Al.
322 See Norman Fost, Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important that Organ
Donors be Dead? 14 KENNEDYINST. ETHICS J. 249, 255 (2004) (arguing that prosecutors have
tolerated "clearly illegal behavior" by physicians in sympathetic cases).
The Thin Flat Line: Redefining Who is Legally Dead
media, the public was apathetic in its response . 3 A recent study also
indicates that many members of the public may be willing to violate the dead
donor rule because they are confused about the definition of brain death and
when organs can legally be procured from those who suffer devastating
neurological injuries.
32 4
It is debatable whether the public will be apathetic about the expansion
of DCD to victims of sudden cardiac arrest. New York City's plan for organ
recovery ambulances is the first of these initiatives to be aired by the
mainstream media.32 - While many individuals may be confused about the
concept of brain death, they no doubt understand what it means when the
heart stops beating. Many are also understandably concerned about the level
of care they will receive in the event of an unexpected cardiac arrest at home
or at work. It is one thing to argue that adults who consent to the withdrawal
of life support be allowed to donate organs even if we are not quite sure at
what point in the process they are potentially alive or irreversibly dead. It is
quite another to hastily remove organs from victims of cardiac arrest who
expect a thorough resuscitation. Although most people support organ
donation in theory, many are unwilling to become donors or to donate a
family member's organs.326 One of the explanations for this reluctance is the
fear of being declared prematurely dead or that emergency care will be
compromised.3 7 The question that must be asked is, under what circum-
stances will the public be willing to accept a certain level of error in
diagnosing death in order to promote organ procurement?
VI. How Should Death be Defined in DCD Donors?
Recognizing that defining death is not a simple matter, some in the
medical community question whether this is even an important issue. Under
the title, "Philosophical Debates About the Definition of Death: Who
Cares?," Stuart J. Youngner and Robert M. Arnold argue that the concept of
irreversibility is impossibly muddled and that the conversation should turn
323 Id. at 254-56.
324 Laura A. Siminoffet al., Death and Organ Procurement: Public Belief andAttitudes,
14 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 217, 228 (2004) (reporting that ninety-eight percent of study
participants had heard of brain death, but that only one-third believed that brain-dead
persons were legally dead. Of those who considered a brain-dead person alive, over sixty-six
percent said they would donate organs).
325 Cara Buckley, City To Explore a Way To Add Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2008.
326 See Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing Families' Consentfor Donation of
Solid Organsfor Transplantation, 286 JAMA 71,71(2001) (citing studies showing that while
more than seventy-five percent of people said they would donate their organs if asked, less
than half of families actually agreed to donation after death).
327 See DuBois, supra note 318, at 132 (citing surveys showing that significant numbers
of people fear their health care will be compromised if they agree to be organ donors).
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instead to whether it is permissible to take organs from patients who are
"beyond harm," but who may not be dead.328 Robert D. Truog, a prominent
bioethicist, has long argued that the dead donor rule should be abandoned
and that people whom we consider alive, but who are terminally ill or
permanently unconscious, should be allowed to donate organs while still
alive, because the harm inflicted on these patients is minimal. 329 For
example, a person in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), who is not legally
dead,33 ° should be allowed the pre-mortem opportunity to donate her
organs. For these people, the quality of life is so unacceptable or death is so
imminent that, with their consent, we ethically can take their organs before
they die.331 Similarly, other notable medical ethicists, including Fost, assert
that the very premise on which we remove vital organs-death of the
donor-is scientifically flawed, so that certain patients should have the right
to donate organs even if it means a premature death.
3 2
Others contend that we should not abandon the dead donor rule but
rather allow individuals the choice of defining the conditions in which they
could be considered dead so as to allow the removal of organs. Veatch has
argued for over three decades that brain death should include not onlythose
who have complete loss of brain functions including the brain stem, but also
those who have lost only higher brain or cerebral activity. 333 According to
Veatch, those who are no longer "members in full standing of the moral
community" (such as those in PVS) should be able, at their option, to be
defined as dead so that organs could be legally taken without violating the
dead donor rule. 34
The UDDA, UAGA, and most state laws defining death stand in the way
of proposals to abandon the dead donor rule or except certain groups from
its confines. Under the UAGA, one needs to be deceased to be a donor, and
the UDDA defines brain death as death of the whole brain, including the
brain stem.335 Homicide laws also prohibit intentionally causing death
318 Youngner & Arnold, supra note 252, at 533.
329 Robert D. Truog, Brain Death-Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon,
35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 278 (2007).
330 A person in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is not brain dead under the UDDA
because the person has not suffered whole brain death; PVS patients have brain stem
functions. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.1 (describing the
physiological state of Nancy Cruzan, who was in a PVS).
33' Truog, supra note 329, at 278.
32 Fost, supra note 322, at 250-51.
133 Robert M. Veatch, The Dead Donor Rule: True by Definition, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 10,
10-11 (2003).
311 Robert M. Veatch,Abandon the DeadDonor Rule or Change the Definition of Death,
14 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 261, 269 (2004).
"I A number of states also codify the dead donor rule. See supra note 152.
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through the removal of vital organs.336 There have been no serious attempts
to change the legal definition of death and it is to be expected that the public,
courts, and legislators may balk at allowing physicians to remove organs
from the living (as presently defined).337
Others who have expressed unreserved support for the dead donor rule
in removing organs from brain-dead donors struggle with its application in
the DCD context. Despite his early criticism of the Pittsburg Protocol for
allowing organ recovery in patients who were not dead,338 Bernat now
concludes that it is irrelevant whether DCD violates the dead donor rule.339
He acknowledges that by using the true meaning of irreversible, i.e. that a
patient can not be successfully resuscitated, some DCD donors may not be
dead.3 40 To avoid the problem of removing organs from one who is not
irreversibly dead, he advocates substituting the word "permanent" for
"irreversible" in describing the loss of circulatory functions in DCD
donors. 341 Permanent in this context means that functions will not be
restored, either spontaneously by the patient or through artificial resuscita-
tion. 342 Bernat does not advocate changing the UDDA to reflect this change
in terminology, however, because he believes that most physicians are
already using the permanence standard in practice.343 He candidly recog-
nizes that using permanent loss of functions as the test for death in DCD
donors may transgress the dead donor rule, but argues that this exception
is justified because the patient soon will be dead and the outcome is the
same whether using a permanence or irreversibility standard.344
For Truog, Bernat's recommendation for a change in terminology
confirms the obsolete nature of the dead donor rule.345 He views Bernat's
proposal as an implicit acknowledgment that patients under a DCD protocol
336 Truog recognizes the legal difficulty in abandoning the dead donor rule, as it would
mean that organ recovery is the cause of a patient's death. He counters that the transplant
physician's actions could be ethically regarded as not constituting a homicide. Truog, supra
note 329, at 279.
337 See In re TA.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 592 (Fla. 1992) (refusing to declare an
anencephalic infant dead for purposes of organ transplantation).
338 Bernat, supra note 164, at 20 (stating that at the time organs are procured under the
Pittsburgh protocol, "death has not yet occurred").
339 Bernat, supra note 311, at 128-29.
340 Id. at 125, 128.
34, Id. at 124-25.
342 Id. at 124.
343 Id. at 127.
344 Id. at 128-29. Ten years ago, Bernat took a much different position: "Accepting a
circulatory formulation for death immediately throws into jeopardy the entire multiorgan
transplantation program unless the dead donor rule is sacrificed." Bernat, supra note 164, at
22.
345 Robert D. Truog & Thomas I. Cochrane, The Truth About "Donation After Cardiac
Death," 17 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 133, 136 (2OO6).
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are not dead.3 46 By acknowledging the fact that DCD donors may be alive,
Truog contends the transplant community has already crossed the boundary
of the dead donor rule and should be honest and abolish it, both as to brain
death and cardiac death.4 7 Similarly, Joseph L. Verheijde and colleagues,
who have been vociferous critics of DCD because it violates the dead donor
rule, support efforts to eliminate the dead donor rule as long as patients and
their families give meaningful informed consent to the removal of organs
before death.
3 48
There may be legitimate reasons for reconstructing the definition of
death as it applies to organ donation after cardiac death. From a purely
utilitarian view, increasing the supply of organs is a social good. Particularly,
in cases of planned withdrawal from life support-where the patient or
surrogate has chosen not to resuscitate-it may be morally defensible to
declare death within a short period of time in order to facilitate organ
retrieval. Again, a comparison of patients in an ICU is illustrative of this
principle.3 49 Patient A wishes to withdraw life support and to donate organs.
B, also a patient in the ICU, declines CPR, but does not wish to be an organ
donor. B has a cardiac arrest but is not resuscitated. At what point is B
irreversibly dead? The answer is that, in most cases, the exact time of death
does not matter because no surgical intervention, such as organ procure-
ment, is to be immediately performed on the body.3 50 Patient B could be
declared dead at the time of asystole. But it is also likely that a physician will
not rush to declare B dead and that some delay will occur before B is
transported to the morgue. Just like A, B will be "allowed to die," but
precisely when B becomes irreversibly dead is generally of little moral or
legal consequence. 1 Some have argued that if B can be considered dead
when cardiopulmonary functions cease, why should we not consider A, the
controlled donor, dead at the same moment?352 Both A and B are patients in
whom we cannot clearly define the line between life and death, and locating
the moment of irreversible death is more of a moral decision than a legal
346 Id. at 133,136 (stating that DCD is a misnomerbecause donors are "dying but not yet
dead").
347 Id. at 136.
348 Verheijde et al., supra note 236, at 7.
349 This scenario is also adapted from a similar hypothetical described in Youngner et
al., supra note 158, at 17.
350 The time of a non-donor's death could be of legal significance under some
circumstances, however, such as whether a person survived another under the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act. UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH AcT §§ 2-4 (1993), 8B U.L.A. 147 (2001).
351 See Jerry Menikoff, The Importance of Being Dead: Non-Heart-Beating Organ, 18
ISSUES IN LAW&MED. 3,6 (2002) (stating that until physicians wanted to remove organs from
non-heart-beating donors, there was no rush to declare death and a person could be
pronounced dead as long as an hour after the heart stopped beating).
35" See Bernat, supra note 3n, at 127 (defending the timing of death in DCD donors
because it is consistent with how death is usually determined in the non-donor).
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one. Defining irreversibility to mean that the heart will not be started in
controlled DCD at least fulfills the patient's wishes to end life-sustaining care
and to become an organ donor. As John Robertson argued:
Not to regard her then as dead because she might have been resuscitated
in a situation in which she never will be resuscitated is counterintuitive to
common understandings of death held by the general public, families,
health care providers, and most ethicists, philosophers, and lawyers who
study these issues.353
There may be limits, however, to how far the transplant community can
legally or ethicallyventure in controlled DCD. Even some supporters of DCD
draw the line at calling death in less than two minutes and do not support
transplanting hearts from DCD donors, a practice which seems on its face
to squarely contradict any notion of the irreversibility of circulatory
functions.35 4 But accepting some restrictions, preferably set in place by
legislators along with medical experts, DCD in adult controlled donors could
proceed.
Nonetheless, this resolution of the debate also means that, with DCD,
death will be defined not by an irreversible physiological state but by the
context it which it occurs. If we redefine irreversibility in order to retrieve
viable organs from controlled donors, where will our "gerrymandering"355 of
death criteria end? Truog argues that if DCD is ethically acceptable even if
donors are not quite dead, it should be permissible for other consenting
terminally ill or neurologically devastated patients to donate their organs
under general anesthesia before death .356 After all, it is certain that they, too,
will soon be dead and their organs will be more useful if recovered before
death.3 7 Ultimately, "For better or for worse, the bright line [between life





With controlled donors, we can say their intent is to have life support
removed, to die, and to donate their organs. The public may not care
whether these patients are declared dead a little early in the dying process.35 9
But this reasoning cannot seamlessly be applied to uncontrolled donors. We
can not easily determine the wishes of those in sudden or unexpected cardiac
353 Robertson, supra note 200, at 12.
151 See Bernat, supra note 14, at 671(stating that recovering hearts from DCD donors and
determining death seventy-five seconds after heart stoppage exceed the boundaries of DCD);
Veatch, supra note 211, at 673 (contending that the removal of hearts from DCD donors is the
cause of death).
355 Arnold & Youngner, supra note 151, at 222 (arguing that the concept of brain death
was an effort to "gerrymander" the definition of death to increase the donor pool).
356 Troug, supra note 329, at 278.
357 Truog & Cochrane, supra note 345, at 134.
31' Arnold & Youngner, supra note 151, at 224.
311 Bernat, supra note 311, at 129.
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arrest. In most cases, these patients want to be resuscitated and to live. To
begin the organ procurement process only a few minutes (or seconds) after
"unsuccessful" resuscitation in victims of sudden cardiac arrest seems to
give insufficient respect to their personal autonomy and to jeopardize their
small, but increasing, chance of survival.
Under the protocol being considered in New York City, emergency
responders will call the time of death when further resuscitative efforts are
deemed futile. 360 With the organ recovery ambulance hovering nearby, there
is a risk that some people will fear that they will be abandoned too soon.
Such suspicions may not always be justified, but they are understandable
and can undermine confidence in the transplantation system. We should
proceed cautiously if DCD is to be expanded to this population so that
organs will not be inadvertently removed from those few who may still be
"slightly alive. ''36'
There are several possible solutions to this debate. The first, and most
preferable, option is to alter death statutes to define irreversibility in
patients voluntarily withdrawing life support (who are not brain dead) as the
time of cessation of circulatory functions plus a period that scientific studies
demonstrate would exclude the possibility of self-resuscitation. This
definition would affect not only organ donors; death would have the same
meaning for all who electively withdraw life-sustaining measures. Part of the
dilemma over the meaning of irreversibility is that the UDDA and many
state death statutes were enacted before patients had a legal right to choose
whether to be kept alive through extraordinary medical treatment. In
promoting a standard of irreversibility that requires an inability to
resuscitate, the UDDA fails to recognize that many deaths in hospitals today
are from a planned withdrawal of life support in patients who refuse further
resuscitation. Thus, defining death in this population to mean the cessation
of cardiopulmonary functions plus a waiting period to exclude self-
resuscitation acknowledges both legal approval and social acceptance of the
"right to die." Along with this statutory recognition, the medical community
must come to a common understanding and clear criteria about how long an
interval is necessaryto rule out the possibility of autoresuscitation. The idea
that, after two minutes (or seventy-five seconds), one can be considered
dead in one hospital but alive in another is inexcusable.
Although a delay of only a few minutes from arrest to declaration of
death in patients for whom there will be no resuscitative efforts may be
acceptable, that short an interval is not tolerable in individuals undergoing
360 See Buckley, supra note 2.
361 See, e.g., William J. Burke, More Donors Could Be Survivors, ST. LOUIS REV. ONLINE,
June 13, 2003, http://www.stlouisreview.com/article.php? id=4179 (asserting that DCD
deprives some donors of a chance at survival and calling for a halt to the practice in Catholic
hospitals).
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CPR. Irreversibility in its common sense notion-that functions cannot be
reversed-should be retained for all other individuals, a standard that takes
into account the great strides in resuscitation being made today and that
provides a measure of safety from an erroneous diagnosis of death.
The second option is to wait at least ten minutes or longer to declare
death in all DCD donors to make sure that any attempt at resuscitation
would fail, i.e., we can not reverse because the brain is irreversibly
damaged.362 The transplant community has resisted this construal of
irreversibilitybecause of concerns about how longer waiting times can affect
organ viability. Yet studies over the last two decades tend to demonstrate
that a ten-minute waiting time does not impair long-term survival rates in
recipients of kidneys, the organs most in demand. The primary drawback to
this proposal is using a fixed period of time to determine irreversibility in
the uncontrolled donor. With victims of sudden cardiac arrest, the prevailing
view has been that after ten to fifteen minutes of pulselessness, irreversible
brain damage inevitably follows. As discussed previously, recent studies
have demonstrated that with innovative resuscitative therapies, some
patients can survive prolonged periods of cardiac arrest, with little
neurological sequelae. The period of time from arrest to organ procurement
should, therefore, vary according to current medical knowledge and
technology. Appointing a fixed hands-off waiting period to uncontrolled
donors may deny future victims a possible chance of survival.
The third solution is to do nothing. DuBois argues that the meaning of
irreversibility should remain vague and left to physicians to define depend-
ing on the context. 36 3 The do-nothing solution may preserve the status quo
in controlled donors, but in light of the apparent expansion of DCD to
uncontrolled donors, to children, and to heart transplants, public engage-
ment on this question is inevitable. There are cutting edge issues associated
with DCD that have received little attention. Protocols acceptable in the
adult population may not transfer in toto to child DCD donors. Recovering
hearts and reanimating them in the recipient or using ECMO or other
techniques to restore circulation and possibly resuscitate the brain seem to
transgress the "prudent boundaries" of DCD.36" These are practices that
should not be pursued until such time as they have been fully examined and
approved by both the medical community and policymakers.
36 Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162 (suggesting that a ten to fifteen minute wait might
be appropriate).
363 DuBois, supra note 318, at 127.
364 Bernat, supra note 14, at 671.
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Conclusion
The focus of organ transplantation has been almost exclusively on the
welfare of the recipient of organs rather than the donor. Perhaps that is as
it should be; medicine needs to concentrate on the living rather than on the
dying. Denton Cooley, one of the pioneers of heart transplantation, stated:
"We should notjeopardize the possible survival of the recipient while we are
waiting around to make a decision whether the cadaver, as you call it, is dead
or not." 6 ' Pragmatism, however, can only go so far before basic legal and
ethical principles are compromised, and it is worthwhile to ask if we should
redefine who is dead in order to salvage their organs.
Donation after cardiac death from controlled donors has been proceed-
ing with little public or legislative discussion of whether these patients meet
the legal criteria for death. In our incessant demand for organs, we have
glossed over difficult questions: what does it mean to be dead, and is death,
however defined, a necessary condition for organ donation? There is a need
to air the debate over DCD in the public arena before it is extended to other
situations that present new legal and ethical challenges. Otherwise, what
seems controversial today, for example, removing hearts from infants
seventy-five seconds after arrest and reanimating them in other children,
may become routine and acceptable tomorrow.
Some argue this is an academic controversy that will not spark any
public interest or concern among lawmakers. 66 Others are worried that if
the public is alerted to the debate about the uncertainty of death, its
willingness to donate organs will diminish 6.3 7 Yet this is a public policy issue
that should not be decided by the medical community alone. 368 The organ
transplant system depends on civic participation, and the dispute over
whether organs should be taken from some patients before death deserves
discussion beyond the pages of scholarly journals. As DCD moves from
consenting patients in hospitals to unexpected victims in the streets, the
public needs to be reassured that the medical community will not further
manipulate the blurred line between life and death.
The disquiet over DCD maybe rendered moot by the inevitable progress
of science. Through xenotransplantation or the growing of organs from stem
cells, we may someday be able to look to alternative sources of transplant-
365 LOCK, supra note 21o, at 87-88.
366 See, e.g., Fost, supra note 322, at 254-56.
367 See Robert A. Burt, Where Do We Go From Here? in THE DEFINITIONOF DEATH: CON-
TEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 332, 333 (Stuart J. Younger et al., eds., 1999) (arguing that
legislative changes may provoke public distrust of organ donation).
368 See Menikoff, supra note 351, at 20 (contending that the debate over the definition
of death should not be sidestepped as it squarely addresses the kind of protections we are
willing to give people in our society).
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able organs. Until that happens, the only source of organs is from
humans-wanted, dead or alive.
36 9
369 "Wanted, dead or alive" is a common phrase from the Old West, but it was also used
in the title of an article about the UDDA. Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 871.

